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MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA 



REPORT 

MADE TO MAJ. GEN. JAMES G. HARBORD, UNITED STATES 

ARMY, CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION, 

ON THE MILITARY PROBLEM OF A MANDATORY 

OVER ARMENIA 



By 

Brig. Gen. George Van Horn Moseley 

GENERAL SERVICE, UNITED STATES ARMY 




PRESENTED BY MR. LODGE 
May 24 (calendar day, May 27), 1920. — Ordered to be printed 



WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1920 



o; ®f ^^ 



CONTENTS. 



Page. 

Introduction 3 

Is America under any obligations to accept mandatory? 6 

Where is Armenia 7 

The military situation in Turkey 9 

The nationalistic movement 9 

The Smyrna situation 9 

Complaints against the British 11 

The Noel affair 12 

The Turkish Army 12 

The Turkish-Armenian frontier 13 

The gendarmerie 14 

Means of communication 15 

The political subdiAosions 16 

Turkey in Europe, Anatolia and the Transcaucasus 16 

The military situation in Armenia 17 

Border "troubles 17 

Zangazeur and Karabagh 19 

Zangazeur 19 

The Armenian Army 19 

The military situation in Georgia 20 

The Georgian Army 21 

The military situation in Azarbaijan 22 

The Azarbaijan Army 23 

Form of government of the mandatory 24 

The military forces to be furnished by the mandatory . 25 

Army 26 

Navy 26 

Constabulary 27 

The initial setting upon undertaking the mandatory * 28 

Lines of communication and supply 29 

Sanitation 30 

Cost 30 

Resume 31 

APPENDIXES. 

A. Map— The Turkish Army. (Not printed.) 

B. Turkish Gendarmerie 32 

C. Table — Armenian Army 38 

D. Statement sho^ving who serves in Armenian Army 39 

E . Brief history of Georgian Army 40 

F. Map showing allied troops in area. (Not printed.) 

G. Turkish Navy ^ 42 

3 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 



American Military Mission to Armenia, 

U. S. S. " Martha Washington," 

Malta, October 19, 1919. 
From : Brig. Gen. George Van Horn Moseley. 
To: Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, Chief American Military Mission 

to Armenia. 
Subject : The military problem of a mandatory. 

When America was confronted with the problem of the recent war, 
every effort was made to keep us from being involved in it. For two 
years we kept on friendly terms with the nations which were at war, 
always with the hope that a settlement would be reached without 
our becoming involved. The efforts we made to keep out of the 
war went so far as to involve the criticism by first one power and then 
another. 

On the other hand, when we finally were confronted with a situa- 
tion which made it our duty to enter the war, we did so on a very 
broad basis. Plans were made to cover every contingency. The home 
Government gave loyal support without regard to party lines, and a 
most carefully selected personnel was placed in charge of all our 
operations. To the professional soldier it was one of the most sur- 
prising features of the war to see our country, in which national 
defense was largely either neglected or based upon unsound legisla- 
tion, entirely reverse itself and go to the limit in adopting sound 
principles for prosecuting the war. This, more than anything else, 
accounts for the national success we have. 

It is my opinion that we must approach the problems of the Near 
East in the same way. Half measures will certainly end in failure 
and show us up in a very unfavorable light as administrators before 
the world. So far we have had only a charitable connection with 
these problems. Repeatedly we have investigated the problems in 
the Near East, generally in connection with the sufferings of the 
Christian population. For years America has been very keenly 
alive to the sufferings of the Armenians. Singly, and in conjunction 
with the other powers, America has, at various times, addressed the 
Porte to institute reforms in the administration of Armenian affairs. 
America has also given large sums, through its missionary agents 
in Armenia, through its Red Cross work, and recently in the distri- 
bution of food and supplies for the destitute of all races in the Near 
East. It is certain, however, that little lasting good can be done 
on a charity basis to guarantee peace and good government in the 
Near East. The correcting of more than five centuries of misrule 
in Asia Minor is no small task. The responsibility can not be met 
by the giving of large sums through missionary societies, generally 
managed by noble characters with little practical business ability. 



6 MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 

All such agencies should be but small incidents in a reorganization 
built on broad lines looking to good government under which the 
individual shall be protected in his labor and receive for it a fair 
profit. 

Suggestions will come for the solution of the problem in Asia 
Minor through the religious organizations which exist there or 
which might be installed. All such efforts would only lead to more 
bloodshed in the name of religion and final failure. The opportunity 
for such a settlement has stood for years at the threshold of first 
one religion in Asia Minor and then another, but to-day we find the 
Near East slowly recovering from conditions which were the worst 
in its history. Those conditions shocked the civilized world at a 
time when its conscience was somewhat deadened by sights of blood- 
shed and cruelty incident to the greatest war in history. 

IS AMERICA UNDER ANY OBLIGATIONS TO ACCEPT ^MANDATORY? 

America can well claim to be the poAver that brought forward the 
covenant of the League of Nations, and that insisted probably, more 
than any other nation, on the principle that the rights of small 
nations should be protected and that they should not be used as 
pawns in the affairs of greater nations. " First and foremost the 
Allies are fighting for the liberties of small nations, to the end that 
they be kept in future free from the tyranny of their more powerful 
neighbors to develop their own national life and institutions." 

The peace conference, led by America in this point, actually put 
this thought into being as far as our problem is concerned, when it 
prescribed in article 22 of the treaty of peace with Germany that : 

To those colonies and territories whicli as a consequence of the hite war liave 
ceased to he under tlie sovereignty of the States whicli forniei'ly soverued them 
and which are inliahited liy peoples not yet ahle to stand hy tlieniselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern woi'ld, there should he apjilied the principle 
that the well-heinii' and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of 
civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust shoiild be em- 
bodied in this covenant. 

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tute- 
lage of such peoples should be intrusted to advanced nations who by reason of 
their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best under- 
take this responsibility, and who are willing to accejit it. and that this tute- 
lage shoidd be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the leagiie. 

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the de- 
velopment of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic 
conditions and other similar circumstances. 

Certain conmiunities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached 
a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be 
provisionally recognized sub.iect to the rendering of administrative advice and 
assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The 
wishes of these communities nmst be a principal consideration in the selection 
of the mandatory. 

Thus we find that delegates representing Armenia have submitted 
their claims for independence to the peace conference at Paris : 

After passing through centuries of oppression and sufferings, our nation at 
the threshold of the twentieth century reached the climax in the universal 
conflagration, torn and covered with blood, but aspiring with a faith more alive 
than ever toward its liberation and the realization of its national ideal, thanks 
to the victory of the allied and associated powers, who have inscribed upon 
their banners the principles of right, .iustice, and the right of peoples to dispose 
of their own lot. 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 7 

Taking their stand upon these great principles, the Armenian national delega- 
tion, interpreting the unanimous voice of the whole nation, a part of which has 
already constituted itself into an independent Republic in the Caucasus, has 
already proclaimed the independence of integral Ai-menia and notified the allied 
governments thereof by a note of November 30, 1918. 

The United States has been pressed to accept the mandate of this 
countr}'^, decimated as it is by massacres, further reduced in man- 
power by the recent war, its people scattered to the four winds by 
war and carefully planned deportations, and its character under- 
mined by the worst influences of its near neighbors. 

The problems of the Near East are ahvays represented as being 
extremely complicated. It is true that they are so, but as one 
travels studying them on the ground he is made to realize at every 
turn in the road that the}^ have been complicated by the intrigues 
and ambitions of the powers themselves playing against eacli other, 
and the peoples included in the unfortunate area have been largely 
neglected as their territory has been occupied or abandoned to 
serve the purposes of the last invader. America has never been 
a party to any of this. She approaches these problems with clean 
hands. The peoples involved know she has no imperialistic plans 
or personal ambitions in the Near East; that she can look at the 
involved questions in an impartial attitude, and it is for this reason 
that she is demanded on all sides. When one studies the problems 
which have brought such suffering to this region, but which could 
be so efficiently handled by the United States under proper adminis- 
trators, he can not but be convinced that it is our duty to step in 
and take over the task, entirely from a disinterested, humanitarian 
point of view, provided it is given to us by the powers under such 
conditions that success can reasonably be expected. It will take 
years to finally settle this problem. The country accepting the 
mandatory must see to it that from the very outset it is granted that 
freedom of action which will make possible a final satisfactory solu- 
tion. Great prestige attaches to the word " America " throughout 
the Near East to-day. Her officers and officials are trusted by all 
sides alike. They are even now called upon to listen to the troubles 
and complaints of peoples in conflict and their decisions are ac- 
cepted without question. But if we ai'e to become involved in 
^accepting this mandatory, it must be remembered we will be playing 
on the' world's stage. The progress of our administration will be 
most carefully watched by all and any mistakes will bring forth 
full criticism, especially by luke-Avarm friends who in their hearts 
would gladly see us fail. We must therefore demand our own con- 
ditions from the start. There must be no half measures. The sac- 
rifice we Avill make in taking the task, if we do, involves a similar 
sacrifice on the part of all nations who must withdraw absolutely 
from the territory covered by the mandate. 

WHERE IS ARMENIA? 

But let us tvj to find this country Avhich the powers would have 
us govern. Does the Armenian problem now exist, or did the Young- 
Turks actually accomplish their purpose " to rid themselves of the 
Armenian problem by ridding themselves of the Armenians"? 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 



In the old family Bible the name " Armenia " generally appears 
for a country south of the Caucasus with its center near Mount 
Ararat, extending across Asia Minor in the general direction of 
Alexandretta. We know that the power of the Armenian kings 
extended for a time to the Mediterranean and to Sivas in the west, 
which was once the seat of the Armenian kings. The map of Ar- 
menia, which their delegates would have us consider, is bounded on 
the north by the Black Sea, Georgia, and Azarbaijan, and extends' 
in a southeasterly direction to include the cities of Alexandretta and 
Mersina on the Mediterranean. It is divided into two parts — ^the 
northern Caucasian Armenia, made up largely from Russian Ar- 
menia, and the second part, Turkish Armenia. Accepting for the 
moment the figures given by the Armenian delegation, we find the 
population of this area in 1914 as follows : 





Turkish 
Armenia. 


Caucasian 
Armenia. 


Total. 


Religion. 


Armenians 


1,403,000 
447,000 
943,000 


1,296,000 
65,000 
61,000 
537,000 
75,000 


2,699,000 
512,000 

1,005,000 
537,000 
556,000 
210,000 
341,000 


}3,211,000 Christians. 


Greeks, Russians, Nestorians, etc 


Turks 


1 


Tartars 




Kurds and Turkomans 


482, 000 
210,000 
303,000 




Lazes, Tcherkess, Arabs, etc 


j 


Kizilbashis, Zazas, Yezidis, etc 


38,000 


341,000 divers religions. 




Total 


3,788,000 


2,072,000 


5,860,000 









The massacres of 1915-16 totaled some 600,000, of whom not less 
than 500,000 came from witliin the borders of this new proposed 
State. Probably an equal number were deported from the same 
area. To this must be added a large number of Armenians who 
fought with the Russian armies, with the Foreign Legion and with 
the British in the Oriental Legion. The percentage of losses among 
those Armenians who served as soldiers has been very heavy. This 
would leave an Armenian population of approximately 1,500,000 
for the entire new State. Outside this new State, but in regions 
bordering on Armenia, that is Asiatic Turkey, the Caucasus and 
Persia, there are probably some 500,000 Armenians. In distant 
regions, such as Constantinople, Turkey in Europe, Persia, Egypt, 
and India, there is another 500,000. It is very doubtful if, at the 
present time, the Armenians are in the majority in the territory pro- 
posed for their new State. Certainly they are not so in Turkish 
Armenia. They claim they should be given credit for Armenians 
massacred and deported, but this is impracticable. We must take 
the problem as we find it. It is clear, therefore, that Armenians 
are spread throughout the Near East. The solution of the problem 
for their protection involves a large area and includes a control 
over the countries in which we find them living to-day. Thus we 
found Armenians throughout Turkey, in Georgia and Azarbiajan. 
This intermingling of Armenians throughout the Near East makes 
it impossible to localize the Armenian problem. Furthermore, 
Turks, Kurds, Tartars, and Georgians and inextricably mixed in the 
same area, and their rights must be guarded as well. If we should 
simply enter the area to guard the rights of the Armenians and con- 
struct for them a new State we would immediately become involved 



MANDATOKY OVER ARMENIA. \) 

with Turks, Kurds, Tartars, and Georgians, and they would fall 
upon Armenians wherever they could be found. America would 
lose all its prestige, it would become involved in extensive militaiy 
operations against all the neighbors of the Armenians, and it would 
take a strong force to protect such a State organized at such a cost. 
If foreign protection were later withdrawn, the new State would 
certainly b.e set upon b}^ its neighbors and its last condition would 
be worse than its first. 

If. therefore, we are to settle the Armenian question we must have 
full authority over all the territory in which they now reside, and 
where unstable governments now exist, namely, Turkey, Russia, 
Armenia, Georgia, and Azarbaijan. It is as impracticable to try 
•vnd solve the problem by attempting to assemble all the Armenians 
in the proposed State as it would be to try to form a German State 
in America by joining Milwaukee and St. Louis with a view of as- 
sembling all the Germans in that area. Besides, many Armenians 
have taken root where they are. The successful Armenians in such 
places as Constantinople, Tiflis, and Smyrna have no idea of leaving 
their well-established homes and assembling in the proposed State. 

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN TURKEY. 

As one investigates the political and military situaton at Con- 
stantinople, he is ever conscious of the undercurrent of political 
activity and intrigue which is already besieging the Sublime Porte. 
The leaders of each besieging group are rather outspoken in their 
attacks on the others. The military situation in Turkey is at present 
largely wrapped up in the Nationalist movement, as we found the 
Government of the Sultan actually exercising very little authority 
except in the near vicinity of Constantinople. 

The Nationalistic movement started with the occupation of Aden 
by the British. The Turks feared that similar occupation would be 
made in Thrace and Armenia. The actual occupation of Smyrna by 
the Greeks was the occasion for the movement to break out generally. 
Many public mass meetings were held in Stamboul. Protests were 
made to the occupation of Smyrna. The fundamental purpose of 
the movement was for the rights of Moslems and for the integrity 
of Turkey as outlined by the armistice. Turks were appealed to to 
shed their last drop of blood before allowing their country to be 
partitioned. 

Coincident with these mass meetings the reserve Turkish officers 
held large meetings and formed a union with the students in Stam- 
boul and with the society called the National Block for the purpose 
of protecting the " national rights.*" Special sections were organ- 
ized for work in propaganda (including women agents), financing, 
and also for military, this latter naturally being entrusted to the 
officers. Large numbers of reserve officers then began to leave Con- 
stantinople for all parts of the interior. Those going toward 
Smyrna helped in the organization and fighting against the Cireeks. 
The others proceeded openly throughout Anatolia with the organi- 
zation for the defense of the " national rights." At the same time 
Moustapha Kemal Pasha, who had gone to Erzerum and there had 
refused to obey governmental orders for his recall to Constantinople, 



10 MANDATORY OVER ARMBISTIA. 

took up reins of the movement and declared his intention of break- 
ing off relations with the Government, if necessary, to secure the 
rights of Moslems. On July 10 he convened the " congress of 
Erzerum," which after various fiery sessions threatening bloodshed 
on all sides, issued a set of resolutions A^ery much modified but in- 
sisting on an undivided Turkey for the Turks. 

Up to this date, the Turkish Government at Constantinople in- 
sisted that the movement was only local and of little importance. 
In various well-informed circles in Constantinople, including Brit- 
ish, French, Turkish, an'd Armenian sources, the belief existed that 
the whole movement was actuall}^ backed by the Government. 
Early in August, it was believed by some that although it had first 
been backed by the Government, the movement had gotten out of 
hand. However, despite this supposition, an official of the ministry 
of the interior declared on September 4 that the ministry was send- 
ing 800,000 Turkish pounds (paper) to the Fifteenth Army Corps 
with headquarters at Erzerum to carry on its work and for propa- 
ganda amongst Kurds and Tartars. 

Our investigations, however, at Sivas, which had since become the 
headquarters of the Nationalist movement, did not confirm this. 
We found that regular funds had been received for the support of 
the Fifteenth Corps. On the other hand, we found that the leaders 
of the Nationalist movement had seA^ered all official communication 
with Stamboul. Army officers generally in the Fifteenth Corps 
seemed to be taking their orders from the leaders of the Nationalist 
moA^ement at SiA^as. 

About the 1st of August, Moustapha Kemel Pasha made a final 
break Avith the British authorities at Erzerum by absolutely refusing 
to hand over munitions stored in his district to the British according 
to the terms of the armistice. Col. Rawlinson, head of the British 
mission at Erzerum, reported this fact to the British authorities 
at Constantinople and was then ordered by them to leave Erzerum 
and go to Kars. 

Early in August, Moustapha Kemal Pasha issued a call for a sec- 
ond congress to be conA^ened at Sivas about August 20. However, 
due to the late arriA^al of the A^arious representatiA'^es, the congress 
did not conA'^ene until about September 1, and continued in session 
until September 10 Avhen it was dissoh^ed after promulgating a new 
series of resolutions based largely upon those of Erzerum. These 
resolutions included (I) a stand for the integrity of the Turkish 
Empire as outlined by the terms of the armistice, October 30, 1918 ; 
(II) national independence and the continuance of the Sultan both 
as head of the State and as supreme caliph; (III) opposition to the 
formation, at the expense of the mother country, of an independent 
Armenia or independent parts of Greece; (IV) discontinuance of 
privileges to non-Musselmen ; (V) to take all methods and means to 
safeguard the Sultan and the supreme caliph, and the integrity of 
the country in the case Turkey, under foreign pressure, should be 
called upon to give up a part of her territory; (VI) to await decision 
for the integrity of the country; (VII) to accept assistance in con- 
nection with scientific, industrial, and economic needs, proA^ded the 
integrity of the Empire was assured; (VIII) the calling of a Na- 
tionalist assembly to take action to safeguard the nation; (IX) the 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 11 

recognition of " the assembly to defend the rights and the interests 
of the Provinces of Anatolia and Roiimelia; " (X) to prosecute the 
Nationalist movement in small and large centers. 

During this last session the congress made a complete break with 
the cabinet at Constantinople, declaring that its policy was disloyal 
to the Turks and prompted apparent!}^ by selfish motives. This 
berak was hastened by a so-called plot of the British and Turkish 
minister of the interior to organize a force of Kurds with the aid of 
the Vali of Kharput to come to Sivas and disperse the congress and 
arrest the leaders. The British and French Governments were de- 
nounced in particular for their attitude toward Turkey in the occu- 
pation of Cilicia and the aid in the Greek occupation of Smyrna. 

It is only natural that the Turk should entertain a very bitter 
feeling against any nationals included within the Turkish Empire 
who Avish to organize a separate state, with a view of having it cut 
off from Turkey. This largely explains the Turks' attitude toward 
the Armenians and Greeks. The Nationalist movement is without 
doubt patriotic. Man}^ of its active leaders are men of high repute. 
These leaders seem to come from all parties. 

A noted example of the better class of Turk is represented in Bekir 
Sami Bey, who has held various governmental positions, and outside 
of monetary affairs has a very fine reputation. At the time of the 
Armenian deportations in 1915 he was Vali of Aleppo and after 
protesting against these deportations without success, he resigned 
his position rather than carry them out. When questioned by a close 
friend as to why he had joined this movement he said that it was 
the only way to retain an uniclivided Turkey. All these leaders have 
worked with every means to arouse the local population. In all the 
talk of the leaders there is much said about fighting to the last 
drop of blood before they would see the partition of Turkey, and 
that Smyrna must be returned to them, an independent Armenia 
must not be permitted, and a foreign power not placed over them. 

As far as can be learned, the brains of the movement are centered 
in Constantinople, having at its head Ahmed Riza Bey. founder of the 
political party of National Block, and in Halide Hanoun, a woman 
of marked talent and high education, with a thorough knowledge 
of English. Her oratorical power is great, and during the mass 
meetings at Stamboid, in her public speeches, she moved many 
Turks to tears b^^ her appeal to flock to the standard for the coun- 
try's defense. During the regime of the Young Turks she was 
prominent in their circles and a close friend of Djemal Pasha, com- 
mander of the army in the Egyptian campaign, and who is now in 
flight with Enver ?asha and Talaat Pasha. Halide Hanoun is also 
the leader of the propaganda work in Constantinople and has a 
strong organization with her. 

In regard to the question of a mandate, the idea of the Nation- 
alLst Party seems to be to accept scientific, industrial, and economic 
assistance only. Their sovereignty and independence must not be 
interfered with. In conference with Moustapha Kemal Pasha and 
his principal assistants, he stated it was necessary for his party 
to insist upon such conditions. Nothing less would have been ac- 
ceptable to the congress. He pointed out the experience Turkey 
had had in the past, when first one foreign Government and then 



12 MANDATORY OVER AEMENIA. 

another had endeavored to run her affairs. He said he could add 
that there would be no difficulty in the event America was the Na- 
tion to be given the mandatory. All necessary powers would be 
granted to such a mandatory, but such a statement would not have 
been acceptable to the congress as a general proj)osition. 

It is my opinion that Moustapha Kemal Pasha and his party 
stand for a united Islamic Empire. Raouf Bey practically stated 
this. There is nothing in their platform coAering the Christian 
population and the measures to be taken to protect their rights. 
On the contrary, they specially mention the withdrawing of all 
special privileges from non-Moslems. 

Moustapha Kemal Pasha and his assistants, Raouf Bey and Hustin 
Bey, are a dangerous lot. The first two are strong characters, the 
last a weak one. All three will probably go to any length to in- 
gratiate themselves with the Turkish people and with foreign inves- 
tigators, but if they were given power I believe they would abuse 
it, and that all three would become unscrupulous administrators. 

THE TURKISH ARMY. 

As a result of the armistice the Turkish Army has been demobi- 
lized to approximately 43,000 officers and men. 

Fifteenth Corps, headquarters at Erzerum 13, 780 

Third Corps (headquarters not given) 4,680 

Thirteenth Corps, headquarters at Diarbekir 4, 920 

Twentieth Corps, headquarters at Angora 1, 632 

Twelfth Corps, lieadquarters at Konia 2,948 

Seventeenth Corps, headquarters at Smyrna 5, 704 

Fifteenth Corps, lieadquarters at Rodosto 2, 857 

Twenty-fifth Corps, headquarters at Constantinople 3, 948 

First Corps, headquarters at Adriauople 2, 737 

Total '43,296 

The distribution of this force as first demobilized is shown in Ap- 
pendix A (not printed). From the moment demobilization was 
ordered there have been a great many desertions. Some organiza- 
tions were practically disbanded, and I believe the army is even 
below the strength stated. It will be seen that of a total of 43,000, 
approximately 13,000 are in the Fifteenth Corps, which is covering 
the Turkish- Armenian frontier. This strength was verified at the 
frontier with the result that the grand total of the Fifteenth Corps 
was found to be 13,020. 

Since the publication of the map (Apendix A) there have been 
some changes in the organization and disposition of the Fifteenth 
Corps. The actual disposition at the time of our inspection, Septem- 
ber 25-26, was as follows : 

The Turkish Army is not localized in its organization and its 
recent demobilization has a very important bearing on a number of 
problems affecting Turkey to-day. Many of the Turkish soldiers 
were turned adrift without money or supplies. In these cases often 
only two ways were open to them. First, they could get to their 
homes the best they could. In the event they attempted this, it 
was often necessary for them to live off the country. In doing so 
they robbed the local communities. But many are reported to have 
joined local bands and preyed upon the country. As stated above. 



MAXDATOEY OVER ARMENIA, 13 

many have assembled in the regions east of Smyrna and are op- 
posing - the Greek advance. 

The Turkish Army presents to-day a very sad spectacle. The 
organizations we inspected generally lacked clothing and equip- 
ment. Both officers and men were very irregularly and poorly 
supplied and paid. Many units out of touch with Constantinople 
have to maintain themselves by local requisitions. The commis- 
sioned personnel are discouraged and demobilized soldiers are met 
everywhere on the highways. Practically all of them were armed 
either with the Russian or Turkish military rifle. Much of the 
equipment in the hands of troops was not properly turned in on 
demobilization. Lieut. Col. Kenan Bey, commanding the Fifth 
Division, told me that in the Province of Diarbekir alone there were 
some 70,000 rifles in the hands of the people. The demobilized di- 
visions generally have a strength of less than 2,000 and are com- 
manded by a lieutenant colonel or colonel. Corps are commanded 
by colonels or brigadier generals. As to the future of this force, 
the older officers might Avell be pensioned off. The desirable part 
could then be absorbed in a military establishment organized on a 
constabulary basis under foreign command and control. The Turks 
have been soldiers for centuries. They are courageous and good 
fighters, especially when their fanaticism is aroused. Ignorant and 
enduring, the Turk resigns himself to discipline. Lacking in in- 
telligence and initiative his value as a soldier largely depends upon 
his officers. 

The fighting qualities of the Tartars are about the same as those of 
the Turk. 

Only since 1908 have the Kurds been required to serve in the 
Turkish Army. Previous to this they had their Hamidijih regiments. 
They are good horsemen and courageous fighters. They have lived 
the life of brigands and highwaymen. As soldiers they would be 
easily handled and disciplined. In many ways they would appeal to 
the American, and the problem of handling them would be interest- 
ing. 

THE TURKISH- ARMENIAN FRONTIER. 

At the time of our leaving Paris we were informed by the Armenian 
delegation that the Turks under the leadership of Moustapha Kemal 
Pasha were making extensive preparations to attack Armenia from 
across the borders ; that Moustapha Kemal Pasha had distributed 
60,000 rifles with ammunition and grenades to the Turkish civilian 
population in the vicinity of Erzerum and had organized divisions 
and bands. It was stated that one piTrpOse of this movement was to 
prevent the return of Armenians to their homes. Although I would 
not trust Moustapha Kemal Pasha, we saw nothing to confirm this 
Paris report. The Fifteenth Corps deployed covering the Black Sea, 
and the Armenian frontiers and Persia had not been increased in 
strength. No evidence of any crossing of the frontier by organiza- 
tions of the Turkish regular army was found. The frontier was in- 
spected from both the Turkish and Armenian sides. Our Armenian 
informant in Paris had stated that the attack by Azarbaijan was be- 
ing organized by demobilized Turkish officers and soldiers who had 
crossed the frontier and accepted service with the Azarbaijan forces. 



14 MANDATORY O^^EE ARMENIA, 

They pointed out particularly Khalil Bey. I found this officer at 
Nakhichevan. He had taken part in the operations between Tartars 
strength. No evidence of any crossing of the frontier by organiza- 
tions. Although I inspected the Tartar area in the region of Nak- 
hichevan for 80 miles, I saw no evidence of Turks other than Khalil 
Bey. This officer has a bad face, with all the earmarks of a bad char- 
acter. The Turkish outposts had strict orders not to cross the frontier 
for any reason. They were authorized to allow Armenians to cross 
the border in entering Turkey, provided they could show they were 
former Turkish Armenians, as the Turks state they do not want any 
Russian Armenians, whom they claim have Bolshevist tendencies. 

The strip of territory just north of the frontier in Armenia, be- 
tween Kaghizman and Kulp, is infested with Kurds and Tartars. The 
Armenians do not control it and we found great difficulty in getting 
through. The party was attacked by both Tartars and Kurds, part 
of our personnel being held captive over one night. In no case have 
the Armenians shown ability to administer territory included within 
their boundaries and occupied by Tartars, Kurds, or Georgians ; that 
is, they have not been able to keep the peace, and their administration 
has not been satisfactory to the inhabitants except when these in- 
habitants are Armenians. 

THE GENDARMERIE. 

The organization of the gendarmerie in Turkey is by regiments, 
battalions, and companies, all on a very elastic basis, permitting the 
organization to be adjusted to the particular area to which it is 
assigned. For this purpose the regiment may vary greatly in 
strength. One regiment is assigned to a vilayet and it has a battalion 
for each sandjak, which in turn has a company for each caza. The 
regiment is simply an administrative unit. Before the war several 
regiments or independent battalions constituted one inspection dis- 
trict under a colonel. The colonel inspected the organization, made 
changes in stations of units, and studied question of personnel. Tak- 
ing a concrete example in tli« vilayet of Sivas, we find one regiment 
assigned to the whole area for administrative purposes. One batta- 
lion is assigned to each of the sandjaks Amassia, Tokat, and Kara- 
hissar, with one battalion at Sivas. This gives the regiment four 
battalions. The number of companies in these battalions varies from 
four to nine, depending upon the number of cazas to be covered. 
The strength of the companies varies from 80 to 120 men. They are 
subdivided so as to meet the local situation. In Sivas it was reported 
that the pay was only 15 paper pounds per month for married men 
and 10 paper pounds for unmarried men. At Adana I found that the 
dismounted gendarme received 14.50 paper pounds per month, while 
the mounted gendarme received 19.50. The officers and noncommis- 
sioned officers are of poor quality. As a rule the best material they 
had before the war was absorbed in the regular army. A large per- 
centage of these soldiers never returned. The loss of man power in 
Turkey as a result of the war, disease, and interracial conflicts, has 
been appalling. The present approximate total strength of the 
Turkish gendarmerie is 30.000. A more complete report on this sub- 
ject appears in Appendix B. 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 15 

MEANS OF COMMUNICATION. 

One approaches Asia Minor Avith the impression that it is a 
country of most limited means of communication, and that hirge 
parts of it are impassable. This impression is reinforced at Con- 
stantinoj5le after interviews with " experts " on Asia Minor affairs, 
some of whom have seldom crossed the Bosporus. To the American 
who has had experience in the field in Arizona, Texas, and Mexico, 
Asia Minor presents no 'great difficulties. Motor transportation has 
also greatly simplified the problem. The problem is further simpli- 
fied due to the fact that the area we are considering is surrounded 
by ocean highways upon which numerous bases are available. From 
these bases existing railways assure primary distril)ution. while 
secondary distribution can be made by road or trail. The roads 
vary from good to very poor. Generally, excellent road material 
exists on the spot. Pack transportation, however, can go almost 
anywhere. Much of the soil is gumbo similar to that found in parts 
of Texas. In dry weather motor transportation or wagon transpor- 
tation can go over the country in almost any direction except where 
the mountains or gullies make the way impassable. In these regions 
off the railway, transportation of material and supplies would have 
to be made during the dry season. Actual communication could be 
maintained, however, even during the wet season bj^ pack transpor- 
tation. 

Derinje, near Scutari, and Smyrna are excellent bases for western 
Anatolia. From these points primary distribution can be made over 
a large area. The region in the vicinity of Sivas can be reached 
by an excellent military road from Ulakishla, or from the Black 
Sea port of Samsun. Trebizond, also on the Black Sea, could supply 
Erzerum and vicinity, but this is over a military road with bad 
grades, which makes transportation very slow and extremely costly. 
A base at Mersina could meet the needs of Cilicia. It was being 
used by tlie British when we inspected it. It reminds one of a small 
Spanish port situated on an open roa'dstead. Tlie British are using 
one pier and handle in and out an average of 1,700 tons per week. 
There is a second pier capable of handling about one-lialf of this 
amount. This 1,700 tons includes receipts and about equal ship- 
ments of grain to Egypt. A branch of the main line runs to the 
pier used by the British. With improved facilities on additional 
piers the amount of freight which could be handled at this port 
could be greatly increased, but it is not a good commercial propo- 
sition. The commander of the port and his subordinates at the 
dock informed us that often they could not unload during three or 
four days out of the week on account of the sea. Poor as this dock 
is, it affords ample facilities for the supply of the British forces 
approximating an aggregate of 20,000 officers and men stationed 
in Cilicia and as far down the main line as Aleppo. 

Aghalaman Bay, 64 miles west of Mersina, is reported as an excel- 
lent protected bay, equally available. We talked with the British 
officer who had just made a survey of this bay. He reports it as 
excellent, and that docking facilities could be made with small out- 
lay of funds. From a study of the terrain, it looks as if it would 
be difficult to extend the branch line to this bay. This project should 



16 MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 

be carefully studied, as Alexandretta is reported no better than 
Mersina and by some not as good. We had no opportunity to inspect 
Alexandretta ourselves. 

All the railways are equipped with telegraph. Telegraph lines 
also run along all the principal Government highways, so that the 
headquarters of each Vilayet and most principal towns are con- 
nected up by telegraph or telephone. The military roads have often 
been wonderfully laid out and constructed on a first-class basis 
throughout, including fine stone bridges and culverts, but they are 
fast going to pieces. Only in very rare instances did we see any 
work being done on them. When one reaches the Transcaucasus he 
realizes that the three so-called republics are established on fou&ida- 
tions well built by the Russians and that their Governments are now 
equipped with the plunder left by the Russian Government and its 
army when they withdrew. So it is in Turkey. The Turk has con- 
structed little himself. On the contrary, he allows whatever is 
turned over to him to go to pieces, to deteriorate and decay. The 
Turks in Constantinople are simply camping on the remains of a 
once famous and well-built city whose remains are now shown to 
the visitor generally surrounded or surmounted by shacks and hovels 
with their filthy inmates. 

THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISIOIVS. 

The discussion of this subject forms no part of this report only in 
so far that it is important to point out that the present subdivision 
of Turkey into Vilayets would greatly facilitate control by a mili- 
tary government. For the normal Vilayet 10 officers should be pro- 
vided. A military governor with one assistant, a commanding officer 
of the constabulary with two assistants (the constabulary to be a 
force absorbing the best parts of the army and gendarmerie), a pro- 
vost marshal, a provost judge, a sanitary inspector with two assist- 
ants, a total of seven line officers and three officers of the medical 
department. There are 15 Vilayets included in the Turkish Em- 
pire as outlined by the armistice. There is an equal number of sand- 
jaks. Approximately 300 officers would therefore be needed for 
administrative purposes in Turkish Provinces. In some instances an 
excellent civilian governor might be found in office whom we would 
not displace. In other places, as local conditions improved, civil 
governors of suitable character could be found and installed thus 
freeing American officers for other duty, but at the outset we should 
figure on having sufficient American officers available for all these 
positions. The navy and army required will be discussed after the 
situation in each subdivision of the proposed mandate has been con- 
sidered. 

TURKEY IN EUROPE, ANATOLIA AND THE TRANSCAUCASUS. 

Before proceeding to take up the Transcaucasus, it is most impor- 
tant to consider strategically the three great subdivisions of the 
area alone and in connection with each other. It is also important 
to consider what is to become of these areas when the mandatory 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 17 

withdraws. The area under consideration groups itself into three 
distinct areas, Turkey in Europe, Anatolia, and the Transcaucasus. 

In the past Constantinople has generally been the goal for the 
campaigns which have so disturbed the Balkans. This was due to the 
conflict of the powers in their efforts to reach Constantinople by 
controlling an overland route to, that city through the Balkans. 
The Balkan States were molded and remolded to make such a plan 
possible for first one power and then another. One of the most im- 
portant tasks of the League of Nations will be to see to it that no 
such juggling is permitted in future. This can be made easier if we 
remove Turkey in Europe from the grab bag by first turning it over 
to a mandatory and then by internationalizing it. Or the territory 
of Turkey in Europe, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles inclusive, 
could be then organized into an autonomous state with its neutrality 
fidly guaranteed by the powers. Now is the opportune time to 
move Turkey out of Europe. The trek of the Turk has already 
started eastward and such a policy would stimulate it. Constanti- 
nople will ever remain a polyglot city at a most important road 
crossing. 

It can truly be said that practically all European wars begin and 
end in the Near East. This war has been no exception, and by 
removing the tempting price of Constantinople from all the peace 
of the world will be so much more assured. It will be many years 
before Anatolia will cease to need a mandatory or a directorate. 
The estimate that was made of Turkey by the peace conference and 
published to the world in June is only too true. Unfortunately 
some of the powers who helped frame the note are largely responsi- 
ble for the conditions which they so well describe. 

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN ARMENIA. 

Strategically Armenia is in a very seriovis situation. The only 
railway entering it passes through Greorgian territory. This is 
practically the only means for bringing supplies into xA.rmenia. 
It is always with the greatest difficulty that these shipments are 
arranged. The base port, Batum, is in territory hostile to Armenia 
and Armenians. In addition to having such a perilous line of com- 
munications, Armenia itself is surrounded by enemies and she is 
now involved in almost 360° of border troubles. 

In December, 1918, border warfare broke out between Armenia 
and Georgia over the district of Borchalo and Akhalkalaki. The 
Borchalo district is inhabited by Armenians, Georgians, Tartars, 
and Greeks, the Armenians claiming the majority. The situation 
is further complicated by the presence in the district of valuable 
Aliverdi copper mines controlled by a French company. Georgia 
claimed that the region was the gateway to Tiflis and she therefore 
had added claims to it for strategic reasons. Akhalkalaki is re- 
ported as being strongly Armenian, but is claimed by Georgui for 
historic reasons. The conflict was soon stopped by the British, 
who declared Borchalo a neutral zone, placing a British governor 
in charge. The presence of this one British officer has been suffi- 
cient to guarantee the neutrality of the area. The Akhalkalaki 
district passed to Georgia and is now incorporated in that State. 
S. Doc. 281, 66-2 2 



18 MAjS^DATORY over ARMENIA. 

The anti-Armenian feeling in Georgia was again aroused by the 
refusal of Armenia to join Georgia and Azarbaijan in a defensive 
league against Denikin. 

The districts of Ardahan and Olti are both overwhelmingly Mo- 
hammedan. Although the Armenian frontier included both these 
districts, she was never able to exercise her control over them. At 
present, Ardahan district is under local Tartar control, while Olti 
district is under local Kurd control. 

The province of Kars had been organized by the Turks immedi- 
ately'^ after the armistice into the southwestern Republic of Kars, 
and as such it prevented the repatriation of Armenians until the lat- 
ter part of April, 1919. This province is composed of the districts 
of Kars, Kagizman, Ardahan, and Olti. Pre-war figures show the 
population of the province to be Mohammedans 54,000, Armenian's 
42,000, and other nationals 21,000; Kagizman with 22,000 Mohamme- 
dans, 21,000 Armenians, and 2,000 other nationals. The province 
was occupied by the Armenians and British in the latter part of 
April, 1919, and the Armenians repatriated to a large extent. In 
July and August insurrections broke out in connection with the Tar- 
tar outbreaks in Nakhichevan. The trouble is not yet settled. The 
Armenians do not control the district extending from Kagizman to 
Kulp. This is controlled by roving bands of Tartars and Kurds. 
Border warfare here may be expected at any time. 

The most serious border situation is in the direction of Nakhiche- 
van. Here a serious outbreak of the Tartars took place in the latter 
part of June. The trouble is still going on. The Tartar outposts 
stand only 30 versts from Erivan. This district is predominantly 
Tartar and had been occupied by the British and Armenians in the 
latter part of April, after the dissolution of the local Tartar govern- 
ment by the British. The British troops were withdrawn about the 
middle of May. As a hotbed of Mohammedanism and under agita- 
tion of Turkish agitators, chief of whom is Col. Khalil Bey, the revo- 
lution gained force, and in July Tartar troops advanced to within 
20 versts of Erivan. 

In conference at Nakhichevan, at which was present the governor, 
Samid Bei Jamlinski, Col. Khalil Bey (an ex-Turkish officer). Col. 
Kalbalai Kan, Capt. Villaret, and the undersigned, the following 
points were gi^-^en ns as a basis upon which the Tartars asked for 
settlement : They claim that bloodshed started due to Armenian 
misgovernment. They ask that a committee investigate the situa- 
tion for the information of the outside world. They were pleased 
to have their case investigated by the Harboard mission. They point 
out that in the district there were 90 per cent Tartars and 10 per 
cent Armenians. In view of this fact, they do not understand why 
it was that an Armenian Government had been placed over them. 
They claim that Mussulmen in Armenia are badly treated and that 
they are treating Armenians fairly. They consider themselves 
united with the Azarbaijan Government because of religion, lan- 
guage, and customs. They claim that the Armenians brought this 
distress in the region and that they are doing all in their power to 
relieve it by aiding both the Tartar and Armenian refugees. They 
suggest an exchange of prisoners to prevent suffering. They state 
they would not submit even if Azarbaijan gives up the territory. 
They ask that a certain American missionary, who, they say, mixed 
up in political questions, be withdrawn. This problem is in process 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA, 19 

of solution, as it is proposed to proclaim the area a neutral zone 
under an American governor. This will settle the question only 
temporarily. 

Col. Kalbalai Kan stated that he thought it was necessary to have 
all the Caucasian States under one power so that questions of 
boundary lines would not be so critical. This is a sound suggestion 
and the Transcaucasian region must be an integral subdivision of 
the mandate. The northern boundary can be fixed with Denikin, 
the Turks are satisfied with the 1878 frontier. All interior bound- 
aries should largely disappear for the time being. 

Zangazeur and Karabagh, separated from Erivan on the one side 
by a difficult mountain range and on the other by the Tartars of 
Nakhichevan, presents a serious problem for the Armenians. The 
mountain section of Zangazeur and Karabagh is strongly Armenian 
and their people have retained much of their independence through- 
out the centuries of oppression in other regions. The Armenians 
in this region are all mountaineers and are in every way a fine 
type. These regions have produced excellent soldiers. 

Upon the arrival of the British in the Caucasus the two districts 
were in dispute by Armenia and Azerbaijan. The British declared 
the two districts neutral and then appointed Dr. Sultanoff governor. 
To this all Armenians objected, and they refused to acknowledge 
the authorit}^ of Dr. Sultanoff, saying that inasmuch as the district 
was neutral a neutral governor should be appointed and not a 
nominee of either the Azarbaijan or Armenian Governments. Dr. 
Sultanoff Avas placed in poAver at Shousha b}^ the British, but his 
authority did not penetrate far into the mountain districts. A 
British regiment, which was located in the valley from Evlak to 
Shousha, was largely withdrawn in late May. Following this oc- 
curred the massacres at Shousha, on June 4 and 5, when 620 Ar- 
menians were killed and a number of Armenian villages destroyed. 
About three British officers and 20 enlisted men were in the city at 
the time, and about 150 in the vicinity. Fighting liroke out between 
Armenians and Tartars. Sultanoff was taken to Baku for investi- 
gation, but was again installed as goA^ernor of the districts about 
the last of July. Fighting to some extent continued in xA.ugust. 
Since then fighting has ceased and Karabagh has agreed to acknoAvl- 
edge Azarbaijan until the peace conference settles its destiny, and 
in the meantime is to have autonomy. 

Zangazeur has not acknoAvledged the authority of the Tartars, 
but the situation is quiet at present. There is immediate danger of 
operations in the region by Azarbaijan forces and resistance by the 
Armenian population. The Azarbaijan goA'ernment Avants aii all- 
Moslem route for the raihvay AA^hich is being built from Baku to 
Djulfa. In the meantime the plan is probably to Avell-Tartarize all 
the districts through AAdiich the railway passes. They can not entirely 
Tartarize the line to Batum, but Armenia Avould be poAverless to 
stop the shipment of troops through her territory. 

THE ARMENIAN ARMY. 

The war minister is head of the entire military establishment. He 
is responsible only to the council of ministers and to the Parlia- 
ment. There is a commanding general Avho is subordinate to the 
Avar minister. 



20 MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 

The army is composed of regulars, volunteers, and militia. 

At the base of the army are the regular troops, composed of (a) 
three separate brigades of two regiments each. With each brigade 
a separate division of artillery of two battalions each; (h) one sepa- 
rate mounted brigade of two mounted regiments of three squadrons 
in each regiment; (c) three separate sentry battalions for the pur- 
pose of local garrison service; (d) engineers and technician troops 
composed of one battalion of engineers, one division of wireless teleg- 
raphy, one section of motor cars, two armored trains, and the separate 
aviation detachment. 

The volunteer units are formed as a temporary measure to attract 
the refugees into the military service. The following units com- 
posed of volunteers are counted in the number of units of the army : 
(a) Separate volunteer brigades of two regiments; (5) three sepa- 
rate volunteer battalions; and (c) two separate volunteer mounted 
divisions. Finally, in order to guard the frontiers, in several regions, 
out of the local inhabitants not due to military service, are formed 
several units on the principle of militia. They are as follows : {a) 
Separate brigade of military composed of two regiments; (b) sepa- 
rate battalion of militia. 

The distribution of the troops : To simplify the administration 
of the troops, all military units are divided into two groups : (a) 
Erivan and (h) Alexandropol groups. The Erivan group, 
composed of one infantry brigade, one brigade of militia and 
one volunteer brigade, is disposed in the regions Igdir, Novobaiazet, 
Kamarlu, Erivan, and Nakhichevan. The Alexandropol group, com- 
posed of two infantry brigades, one mounted brigade, the aviation 
detachment, and the battalion of engineers, is disposed in the regions 
Kars, Sarikamish, Alexandropol, Delidjan, and Karakliss. 

The total ration strength of the regular establishment is 21,459, 
Avith a total of 13,570 bayonets. The detailed strength by units, with 
statement of material on hand, terms of service for officers and men, 
is given in Appendix C. A statement showing who is required to 
serve in the Armenian army appears in Appendix D. 

The Russian Armenians have been subject to military service in 
the Russian Army, in which they have furnished many leaders. They 
compare very favorably with the best Russian soldier of the prewar 
imperial army. The Turkish Armenians were not subject to military 
service until after 1908. They fought well in the Turkish Army in 
1912. They showed skill and courage on the Caucasian front in 
1914-1917. The Armenian is intelligent and patriotic. Wlien well 
led and equipped, he compares favorably with the best. At present 
they are greatly in need of equipment, munitions, and clothing. In 
their present position, even when they can finance a purchase of mili- 
tary stores, they have great difficulty in getting Georgia to let the 
shipments pass. 

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN GEORGIA. 

Although Georgia occupies a strategic position in regard to 
Armenia, controlling as it does the line of communication upon 
which Armenia's life depends, Georgia has many very serious 
troubles of its own. It has border troubles with Denikin on the 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 21 

north. Azarbaijan wants territory which comes very close to Tiflis. 
I Iiave already outlined her border troubles with Armenia. The port 
upon which she depends, Batum, is in the Moslem district by the 
same name. Remembering the critical strategic setting of Armenia, 
one might write the proportion, Georgia is to Armenia as Batum is 
to Georgia. 

Georgia's troubles with Denikin resulted from her joining hands 
with Denikin in 1918 in clearing up the Black Sea province. It is 
reported that the Georgian troops looted and robbed this rich area. 
Denikin sent them back. Technically a state of Avar existed between 
them. The Georgians withdrew to the line of the River Bzyb. 
Denikin's forces held the line of the Mekhadir just north. British 
troops patrolled between the two and prevented conflict. The Geor- 
gians claimed their frontier should be along the Mekhadir for stra- 
tegic reasons. On the Mekhadir the mountains come very close to the 
sea, leaving onl}^ a short river line to defend. On the Bzyb the 
mountains are quite a distance from the sea, leaving a considerable 
river line to defend. 

In May, 1919, the Georgians advanced and occupied the river Mek- 
hadir, which they now hold. In advancing they looted Gagri which 
is situated on the coast. Denikin is reported to have said that he 
wnll have no further dealings with the Georgians until they with- 
draw south of the Bzyb. 

The Province of Batum is claimed by Georgia. Strategically 
Georgia certainly needs it if Georgia is to remain an independent 
• State. Batum is now occupied by British troops, three battalions. 
If the British should withdraw from Batum before being relieved by 
allied troops, what would happen ? Georgia would attempt to grab 
Batum Province. The people of Batum are mostly Moslem and they 
would rebel. They are a wild lot of brigands. They could, in a 
very short time, so destroy the railway as to entirely disorganize the 
whole Transcaucasian territory. 

The Georgian Government is not stable; neither are the Georgians. 
They are spectacular, have a showy brigandish sort of manner. It 
seems like a Punch and Judy show to see them plajdng with self- 
government. 

THE GEORGIAN ARMY. 

The strength and disposition is as follows : 

Total strength, 1,100 sabers, 11,000 rifles, 54 guns; national guard, 
10,000 rifles, 16 guns. 

Gagri front, 200 sabers, 1,500 rifles, 12 guns; 800 rifles of na- 
tional guard. 

Dushet-Kazbek area, 500 rifles, 2 guns. 

Tiflis, 500 sabers, 2,300 rifles, 20 guns; 1,200 rifles of national 
guard. 

Ozourgeti and Notanebi, 200 sabers, 1,500 rifles, 8 guns; 800 rifles 
of national guard. 

Akhaltsikh area, 200 sabers, 1,400 rifles, 8 guns; 800 rifles of 
national guard. 

Borchalinsk area (Batum Province), 300 rifles, 2 guns. 

The Georgians have been subject to military service in the Rus- 
sian Army and they have furnished generals in that army. They 



22 MANDATORY OVER ARMEISTIA, 

are more intelligent than the Tartars, but less so than the Arme- 
nians. They appear showy on parade, but their history does not 
show them dependable in battle. Eecently they have shown some 
socialistic tendencies. A statement made by the minister of war 
of Georgia on the armed forces of the Republic of Georgia appears 
in Appendix E. 

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN AZARBAI.JAN. 

Like Armenia, Azarbaijan is dependent upon Georgia for her line 
of communications. At present the relations between Azarbaijan 
and Georgia are friendly, so Azarbaijan has no trouble in getting its 
supplies through on the railway. These two countries have a defen- 
sive alliance against Denikin. They are also drawn together in hav- 
ing a mutual contempt for Armenia. The all around strategical 
situation of Georgia, beginning at the north, is as follows : 

Georgia is very much afraid of Denikin on the north and wants 
Daghestan as a neutral area to protect them on that frontier. The 
conditions in Karabagh, Zangezeur, and Nakhichevan have been con- 
sidered under Armenia. Azarbaijan claims more territory toward 
Tifiis as being Tartar in majority. Georgia largely controls her 
commercial and supply situation by controlling the railway. But 
Azarbaijan generally controls the oil which is used throughout the 
railway. 

The most important situation is that of Daghestan in its connec- 
tion with Denikin. The natural dividing line between Daghestan 
and Azarbaijan is the Samour Chay. The people of Daghestan are 
made up of a great many tribes. Communications have been always 
very poor and often these tribes do not understand each other. Cul- 
ture is not high. Religion is fanatical and Moslem. The coast lan- 
guage of the Kalmyks is the most general common language. These 
people love their freedom and are willing to fight for it. It took the 
Russians 60 years to conquer them. When conquered they are re- 
ported to have carried out the Russian conditions honestly. The 
Russians report them savages but honest. The Russians ruled by 
means of officers, many of whom were dishonest and all of whom 
were ignorant of local conditions. The curse of the Transcaucasus 
seems to have been the low character of the Russian officials. ISTumer- 
ous rebellions resulted which were put down one after another by 
Russian troops. 

After the Russian revolution broke out, there was formed a union 
of the "Peoples of the Mountains." This was an alliance of the 
north Caucasus Mountain tribes. Denikin in his first advance 
toward Baku took all before him until he reached Daghestan. 
Daghestan and Azarbaijan appealed to the British, who halted Deni- 
kin on the frontier of Daghestan. Denikin said he would not cross 
this border. About this time there was organized in Daghestan a new 
party called the Old Officer Party, with Gen. Halilof at its head. 
Not long thereafter Denikin advanced without opposition to the 
Azarbaijan frontier. This was permitted by the Old Officer Party, 
whose leader, Halilof, it is stated, was bought off. On the other 
hand, this Old Officer Party probably saw hope for advancement of 
themselves and their country in the Denikin movement, while the 
mountain tribes were a wild lot, entirely incapable of self-govern- 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 23 

ment. Denikin claimed the British had allowed him a new line, 
Kazil Biirun-Rzyb River, on the Black Sea. Both Daghestan and 
Azarbaijan protested to the British, and a new line was established 
for Denikin extending from a point 5 miles south of Petrovsk to 
the Rzyb River. No Georgian or Azarbaijan territory was in- 
cluded by this new line, and only a small strip was taken from 
Daghestan. Denikin claimed that a port on the Black Sea (Pe- 
trovsk) was necessary as a base for his operations against Astrakhan. 
Denikin's forces were driven back. This new line satisfied Georgia 
and Azarbaijan; but it did not satisfy Denikin, who claimed that 
further territory was necessary to enable him to keep order along 
the railway and in Daghestan. The British then permitted Denikin 
to advance to the Azarbaijan boundar3^ Azarbaijan protested that 
this would bring Denikin dangerously near. Azarbaijan asked that 
Daghestan be declared a neutral zone. Denikin not only refused to 
\Vithdraw but he has ordered conscription in Daghestan of all males 
between 19 and 42. He said that all such troops would be employed 
in operations against Moscow. This has greatly irritated the moun- 
taineers of Daghestan, who under Russian rule were not required to 
serve. They did furnish some "savage regiments" during the war 
which fought very well. 

The Daghestan representative at Baku is now complaining that 
Azarbaijan does not permit munitions to cross her frontier into 
Daghestan for use against Denikin. It appears that Azarbaijan is 
trying to pursue a very strict course on the frontier. She permits 
no munitions to cross into Daghestan and she interns any soldier 
crossing into her territory. She has also withdrawn her frontier 
stations so as to avoid conflict. They contemplate no aggressive 
action against Denikin. 

The war minister of Azarbaijan complains that he desires to buy 
munitions for his own army, but this is not permitted by either 
Haskell or the British. 

THE AZARBAIJAN ARMY, 

Total strength, 2,500 sabers, 11,000 rifles, artillery, and 25 guns 
lent by Georgian Government, 30,000 armed irregulars, 
Samur River, 1,200 sabers, 6,000 rifles, 16 guns. 
Elisavetpol H. G., normally 1 regiment, 1,600 rifles. 
Baku H, Q,,, 2 regiments, 3,200 rifles. 

The Organization of the Army. 

Infantry. — Two divisions, each containing 3 regiments, and 1 
battalion of reserve. Each regiment consists of 3 battalions. Total, 
20 battalions. 

Cavalry. — One division, consisting of 3 regiments ; in each, 4 com- 
panies. Total, 12 companies. 

Artillery. — Two brigades, each 6 batteries and 1 mountain bat- 
tery (mounted). Every battery has 4 guns. Total, 52 guns. Each 
brigade is attached to an infantry division and the mountain bat- 
tery (mounted) to a cavalry division, 

Sapper troops. — Separate sapi)er company; soon will be trans- 
ferred into a sapper battalion with the representatives of all tech- 
nical specialties. 



24 MAISTDATOKY OVER ARMENIA. 

Military Sebvicb. 

There is used the Russian military law with several changes, 
caused by special local conditions. Engaged are six ages; from 
19 to 24, including two-year service. Engaged are only Moham- 
medans. 

Militia, Gendarmeeie, Police, and Frontier Guard. 

In Azarbaijan the militia does not exist. There are only regular 
troops. The gendarmerie is in the service of the ministry of the 
railway roads for the purpose of guarding the railway roads. The 
frontier guard consists of paid volunteers and has no military 
meaning. 

FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE MANDATORY. 

Before approaching the subject of the military forces which the 
mandatory should furnish based on the foregoing estimate of the 
situation, it is important to point out the form which it is believed 
the mandatory government should take at the outset. Whatever 
success we have had in the past in reconstruction work in our colonial 
possessions has been due, probably more than anything else, to the 
simple and direct form of military government which we installed. 
It is very important in this case that we take full advantage of our 
past experiences and be guided accordingly. Such a government is 
particularly suited to the conditions we find here and the people who 
are to be governed. They have always been accustomed to be gov- 
erned. They understand direct decision from a local authority. The 
fact that they have not always been well governed does not mean 
that the fundamental framework of their institutions are bad; the 
fact is that theoretically the organization of their governments and 
their fundamental laws are generally excellent, but bad government 
resulted from corrupt local officials. It is doubly important, there- 
fore, that the personnel handling the activities of the mandatory 
should be of first quality. We should stick to our military govern- 
ment and its terminology which is now so well understood. This 
military government has always proven itself simple, direct, just, 
and productive of results in the shortest period of time. It does not 
become involved in a maze of complicated laws and decisions which 
delay action. 

One of the first tasks to be accomplished is the cleaning up of the 
area from a sanitary standpoint. No form of government lends itself 
so well to such a task as our form of military government. The em- 
ployment of such a government, however, does not mean we are not 
going to employ civil administratives from the outset wherever we 
find them capable and efficient, but these civil officials would be func- 
tioning under the eye of a military governor, who would have the 
power to remove them in the event they were inefficient or corrupt. 
The aim of a military government would be primarily to train a civil 
personnel which could gradually relieve the military. Competition 
might even be stimulated between Provinces in their endeavor and 
wish to return to complete civil administration. The comparative re- 
ports of inspections might well be published in bulletins showing 
progress of civil government, efficiency of local constabulary and 
police, and progress in schools and education. 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 25 

THE MILITARY FORCES TO BE FURNISHED BY THE MANDATORY. 

The strength of the army of the Black Sea on June 10, 1919, was 
approximately 40,000. The area of this army included Turkey in 
Europe, Anatolia, less the part occupied by the Egyptian command, 
and extending to the crest of the Caucasus Mountains. The subdivi- 
sions of this command are shown on the map which appears in 
Appendix F.^ Gen. Mudge, who commands in Cilicia and whose ter- 
ritory extends down almost to Aleppo, has a force, he told me, of 
approximately 10,000, made up as follows: One brigade of Indian 
troops and Royal Engineers, 1 regiment of cavalry, 1 French bat- 
talion, 3 battalions of Armenians (Armenian Legion). 

This army of the Black Sea includes the British, French, and 
Italian troops, and one Greek battalion. It does not include the 
Greek force of five divisions, totaling 72,000, which entered Smyrna. 
Although all British troops, except three battalions, have been with- 
drawn from the Transcaucausus, we now hear that they are sending 
the Thirteenth Division to Batum. It will, therefore, be safe to 
assume that the British figured that^ a total of 50,000 troops was 
necessary for the area we are considering. This is a total of the 
Army of the Black Sea, plus Gen. Mudge's command of 10,000. It 
must be remembered that they had reserves close at hand, which 
could be drawn upon on short notice; that is, at Aleppo and in 
AUenby's command generally, and in Mesopotamia. To offset this, 
at least in part, it can be stated that the British entered upon the 
task as the result of a hard-fought war. If we came it would be 
in the nature of an army of occupation, which had been requested 
and more or less welcomed. 

The total of the existing military and police force of the countries 
included in the area gives something of an idea of the forces which 
the mandatory should furnish, especially as it is the idea to have 
the existing regular armies pass out of existence and be replaced by a 
constabulary, which in turn would replace the gendarmerie. The 
regular forces, which it is proposed should pass out of existence, 
total 92,000. During the formation of the new constabulary the 
mandatory would have to be in a position to furnish small garrisons 
at a number of places where local conditions would make their 
presence necessary. If the Greeks are to be withdrawn from Smyrna 
a reinforced brigade would be needed there temporarily. In many 
of the villayets the gendarmerie now total 2,000. The Turkish gen- 
darmerie totals approximately 30,000 at the present time. Armenia, 
Georgia, and Azarbaijan have irregular troops, which would have 
to be done away with, the personnel involved returning to work in 
the fields or in commercial life, thereby increasing the number of 
producers and relieving the industrial situation. The loss of man 
power has been appalling, and to-day there are too many carrying 
a rifle, and away from work. 

As for the navy, the British keep station ships at each important 
point and destroyers for purposes of communication. 

The situation in Turkey is somewhat different from that of the 
Transcaucasus. In Turkey we will only need troops at strategic 
points, on the railways, and in addition military personnel work- 

' Xot printed. 



26 MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 

ing on the organization and control of the newly formed constabu- 
lary. In the Transcaiicasus we will use them for the same pur- 
poses, and besides it will probably be necessary to place troops in 
small detachments where the feeling runs high between races on the 
border lines, and to give security while the various nationals are 
being repatriated, reconstructing their homes and adjusting them- 
selves to the new conditions. For much of this terrain cavalry would 
be ideal, but forage is now scarce and the war has taken off most of 
the horses, and these would all have to be imported. 

The following troops would be necessary for the first setting of 
the problem : 

ARMY. 

AggTegate 
(approximate). 

For headquarters, administration services, and services of supply, 300 
officers and 5,000 men 5,300 

1 Infantry division (Roumelia and Anatolia), to contain a complete 
Cavalry regiment, Artillery brigade of 2 regiments of 75's; a third 
bridage added 34, 000 

1 Engineer regiment of 1 railway-operating battalion, 2 railway con- 
structing battalions » 3, 150 

1 Infantry division, made up as follows (Transcaucasus) : Headquar- 
ters — 1 regiment of Cavalry, 1 regiment of Engineers (3 battalions), 
1 regiment 75's, 3 brigades Infantry 25, 000 

Extra officers and noncommissioned officers for constabulary and mili- 
tary government, 500 officers, 1,500 noncommissioned officers 2, 000 

Total 69,450 

To the above must be added an efficient air service. The aeroplane 
can not only be greatly used as a means of communication but its 
value as a means for dealing promptly with a distant small problem 
can not be overestimated. In using it with native troops, its moral 
value is very great. 

These troops would be employed generally as follows: The first- 
mentioned Infantry division, less one reenforced brigade, would be 
in garrison at Constantinople. It would be drawn on to handle the 
situation in Turkey in Europe, but it would always be in readiness 
to be dispatched to any point in the area of the mandate when its 
services might be needed. It would be in effect a small expeditionary 
force. One reenforced brigade would be on duty at strategic points 
in Anatolia and as railway guards in that same area. The railway 
regiment would be split between Turkey in Europe, Anatolia, and 
Transcaucasus, according to the demands of the railway situation. 

The smaller division would be used in the Transcaucasus. The 
division commander could well be the military governor of the area. 
One reenforced brigade would then be available for each of the pres- 
ent subdivisions, Armenia, Georgia, and Azarbaijan. The brigade 
commander in each case could well be the military governor of the 
subdivision. Three hundred officers and 1,000 noncommissioned offi- 
cers are needed for duty with the civil government and constabulary 
of Anatolia. Two hundred officers and 500 noncommissioned officers 
are needed for this duty in Transcaucasus. 

NAVY. 

For headquarters of the mandatory and for each base a station 
ship should be provided. The following places would have to be 
covered in this way: Baku, Batum, Constantinople, Smyrna, Mer- 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 27 

sina. The ships on this duty could be old types which are in reserve. 
There are some Turkish ships which with American crews installed 
could be used for this purpose, if necessary. ( See Appendix G. ) 

Six destroyers would be required for communication; two col- 
liers, one on station and one in United States or en route to this 
station. Oil is here in abundance. A local tanker could be used. 
A hospital ship could be called for from the home fleet when 
needed. A combined store and repair ship would also be needed. 
One transport of light draft and capable of carrying one complete 
regiment should be on station at all times. The transport, store, and 
repair ship could probably be combined in one. All these vessels 
would only need American crews in reduced strength. The nationals 
included within the mandate could be engaged and trained to per- 
form much of this duty. 

The entire force outlined above would have to be made up of vol- 
unteers. If the enlistment period was three years, I believe the 
force could be reduced one-half at the time the first volunteers' terms 
of enlistment were beginning to expire. A force equal to approxi- 
mately one-half the estimate would then have to be maintained in- 
definitely. All this implies that we are left undisturbed in the area 
to work out the problems that confront us without interference from 
without. 

CONSTABULARY. 

The first duty of any mandatory in this region will be to provide 
for and guarantee internal order and the protection of the individual. 
Disorder has been so general that the individual has taken measures 
to protect himself either alone or in combination with his neighbors. 
No plan can be put through for the disarming of the civilian poi^ula- 
tion until the individual is made to feel that he is protected by a 
strong central government. The external affairs of the states in- 
cluded within the mandate will all be taken care of by the manda- 
tory. These included countries will, therefore, have no need for 
armies or navies. These should be disbanded. This will be a great 
relief to the budgets of the governments involved and it will go far 
to assist in the reorganization of their finances. A constabular}'^ 
should be organized at once and be charged with maintaining in- 
ternal order and police. 

The administration and control of this force should be in the hands 
of a chief of constabulary who should be selected by the military 
governor general. While the actual administration and control of 
such a force would be largely decentralized, it should be so or- 
ganized and administered as not to come under the control of local 
civil officials. Each big subdivision of the mandate should be or- 
ganized into an inspection district. Eegiments should be largely 
administrative units flexible in organization so as to meet the needs 
of the Province to which assigned, it being understood that one 
regiment would be assigned to each Province or its equivalent. 

In Turkey the first aim should be for the organization of a con- 
stabulary of 30,000 to replace the gendarmerie. There is no gen- 
darmerie in the Transcaucasus. At the outset the police work there 
would liave to be performed by regular troops furnished by the man- 
datory. A constabulary of 6,000 should suffice for the Transcau- 



28 MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 

casus, ap]3roximately 2,000 being allotted to each State. All organ- 
izations should be changed in station sufficiently often so as to pre- 
vent them from taking root in any district and becoming involved 
in local political conditions. 

This whole force of constabulary'' would be large enough to enable 
the mandatory to absorb and do justice to any efficient and deserving 
nationals of the Oovernments concerned who would wish to continue 
in the military service. 

THE INITIAL SETTING UPON UNDERTAKING THE MANDATORY. 

There has been outlined above the military personnel required to 
handle the problem. These would be furnished by the nation accept- 
ing the mandate. At the outset the League of Nations would have 
to furnish the mandatory positive assistance in the way of plain 
acceptation of certain policies. Without this no self-respecting 
power should accept the task. If America should accept it, it would 
be entirely from a disinterested, humanitarian standpoint and we 
should not go in unless we are fully supported on our own con- 
ditions. 

As stated before, it is believed that the peace of the world can 
be safeguarded better by a proper solution of the Near East prob- 
lems than in any other way. Here is a chance to put the intent of 
the League of Nations on test before the world. Here the practical 
value of the league can be best demonstrated as applied to the 
world's greatest problem. The nation which consents to tackle the 
problem from a humanitarian point of view must have the policy 
accepted that henceforth the Near East is to be organized and ad- 
ministered for the best interests and development of the peoples 
included therein, this in contradistinction to what has happened 
in the past when the territory was neglected or developed as de- 
manded to meet the world's strategic problems. If this acceptation 
is not made, or can not be made, then the problem can not be ex- 
ecuted from a humanitarian point of view, and the jDrinciple of self- 
determination falls down under its first severe test. 

The peace of the world demands the repatriation of the European 
Turk to Anatolia. The world should not permit the conditions 
which have existed at Constantinople to continue, and this area of 
Turkey in Europe should pass first to the mandate and years later 
to a status of internationalization or guaranteed neutrality. The 
mandatory power should be left free to move the Sultan to Ana- 
tolia. All nations now operating in the area of the mandate should 
be required to withdraw at once, leaving their interests in the hands 
of the mandatory. During the continuance of the mandate, all 
foreign legations should be attached directly to the mandatory and 
none others permitted. Foreign military attaches, military in- 
structors, political officers, liaison officers, and foreign commissions 
should not be permitted, except when, authorized by the mandatory 
power and attached to its resident representative. These terms may 
seem drastic, but this " world's sore " is not going to be easily cured 
up unless we honestly face the conditions as they exist and make 
our plans accordingly to tackle the problem anew in accordance with 
the more benevolent, honest, and just principles which are sup- 
posed to be actuating the world at the present moment. The man- 
datory should be left free to announce from time to time what of 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 29 

the peoples included within the mandate are sufficiently civilized, 
cultured, and oroanizecl for self-determination or for autonomous 
government. Thus the mandatory would be authorized to put the 
civil functions of any included government in abeyance as might be 
necessary in the i^olice, sanitation, reconstruction, or reorganization 
of the area. 

The whole area under consideration has recently been involved in 
a World War which has greatly reduced its man power and resulted 
in the complete disorganization or downfall of the Governments 
which formerly governed the area. The temporary Governments 
which have grown up as a result of the war are inefficient and cor- 
rupt. In our tour of inspection throughout the area we did not see 
an official whom I considered fit for a leading position in any first- 
class Government, and no group of such officials when thoroughly 
questioned claimed they were fully competent or fit. It is this con- 
dition, as much as anything else, which makes the services of a man- 
datory absolutely necessary. But the continuance of weak Govern- 
ments susceptible to bribery and intrigue will fit into the situation 
well if prewar conditions are to be revived throughout the area. 

In view of the conditions outlined in the preceding paragraph, the 
mandatory should approach the problem in the form of a very strong 
military government. It is important that a proper setting should 
be given from the start. The whole responsibility should be vested 
in a resident military governor general selected from the army and 
in him should be combined the supreme command of the army and 
navy, with full and complete authority over any and all civil agen- 
cies engaged in the task. 

The headquarters of the governor general would be Constanti- 
nople. He should so organize his office and his administration that 
he could spend not less than half his time inspecting and settling 
questions on the ground, showing himself to the people, inspecting 
their development and encouraging them in it. He should not be 
some far-off dignitary whom nobody sees and who would be admin- 
istering his office entirely through subordinates, and written reports 
handled by interpreters and assistants. 

The whole area of the mandate could then be subdivided into three 
areas, each with its military governor, namely, Roumelia, Anatolia, 
and Transcaucasia. The troops listed for that duty would be as- 
signed to these military governors accordingly. In turn they would 
decentralize their problems. Thus the provincial governors in Ana- 
tolia would report to their military governor, whose headquarters 
might well be at Konia. In the Transcaucasus a subordinate mili- 
tary governor with a suitable staff would take the place of the execu- 
tives of the three governments now in being in that area. Each of 
these governors would report to the military governor of the Trans- 
caucasus region. No effort should be made at the outset to fix final 
boundary lines in this area. The people should be informed that all 
such lines would depend upon the peaceful development of the Prov- 
inces and States involved. 

LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND SUPPLY. 

While Constantinople would be, in a sense, the main base, second- 
ary bases should be selected and equipped from the outset, so that 
no rehandling and transshipping would be necessary. Constanti- 



30 MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 

nople would be the base for Roumelia, Derinje, and Smyrna for Ana- 
tolia. From these points primary distribution would be made by 
rail and secondary distribution by road and pack trail. In Anatolia 
small stores would probably have to be put into some coast towns for 
the supply of troops which could be better reached by sea. 

Batum would be the main base for the area of the Transcaucasus, 
with primary distribution by the railway, the full control of which 
should be taken over at once by the mandatory. 

As time went on natives should be employed more and more as 
laborers, clerks, minor officials, with a view of reducing the demands 
made upon the army, so as to pave the way for its reduction in 
strength. 

SANITATION. 

One of the greatest problems of a mandatory would be that in- 
volved in actually cleaning up Asia Minor. The people in the worst 
districts must be delousecl, the filth of ages must be removed. The 
new generations must be educated in sanitation, both personal and 
public. The regulations governing such matters would have to be 
enforced with increasing severit3^ The armj^ of the mandatory 
entering such a territory would be surrounded, at the outset, by the 
very worst conditions. The troops would have to be equipped with 
the most modern means of sanitation, not only sufficient for them- 
selves but for the police of the area assigned to them. America has 
had wide experience in this line. She conquered Panama in this 
respect, cleaned up Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands 
in a way that had never been thought possible. In the war America 
maintained a higher standard of sanitation in its armies than any 
other allied nation. This cleaning process must start at once and 
proceed simultaneously with the political housecleaning. 

COST. 

The approximate total cost of the mandate would be as folloAvs : 

Army, yearly : 

For Turkey in Europe ami Anatolia .$62,100,000 

For the Transcaucasus 42.075,000 

Total 104, 17.5, 000 

The Naval Establishment involved would not entail any additional 
Federal appropriations. The ships and personnel would be with- 
drawn from the existing establishment and assigned to this duty. 
The only expense to be figured might be the difference between the 
cost of keeping the establishment in near eastern waters and home 
waters. 

To offset our expenditures there would be available a part, at 
least, of the naval and military budget of Turkey. Before the war 
this totaled approximately $61,000,000, about $5,000,000 being for 
the navy. Some of this would be needed for pensioning off deserv- 
ing naval and army personnel. While the source of revenue would 
be reduced due to loss of territory, this might be made up by honest 
handling of public funds and taxes. It is reported that before the 
war there was graft all along the line and only a part of the taxes 
reached the Turkish treasury. The gendarmerie was supported 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA, 31 

locally in each province. This policy could be largely continued 
for the constabulary, or it might work for efficiency and uniformity 
if this tax for the constabulary was actually turned in to the central 
treasury and by it disbursed on a uniform basis. 

It is reported that the total prewar revenues for the Transcau- 
casus was approximately $15,000,000, and that the average annual 
disbursements by Russia were $20,000,000. The mandatory Avould 
have to finance this situation until settled conditions prevailed, when 
the local taxes which have in the past been very light, could be in- 
creased to cover the outlay being made by the mandate. Unquestion- 
ably the whole mandate could be made self-supporting. This whole 
question of cost and finance is fully covered in other reports and is 
only touched on here very briefly. 

RESUME. 

Those who in the late war had administrative experience Avith our 
allies know how very difficult any interallied control is. In the 
war there was only the one mission, to " defeat the enemy,'- but 
plans were often jeopardized, to say the least, by jealous interfer- 
ence and absence of loyal cooperation. Lord Cromer in Modern 
""jgypt correctly states the case when he says: 

The experiment of administrative internationalism lias probably been tried 
in the no man's land of which this history treats to a greatei- extent than in any 
other country. The result can not be said to be encouras'in.t; to those who believe 
in the efficacy of international action in administrative matters. What has l)een 
proved is that international institutions possess admirable negative (pialities. 
They are formidable checks to all actions, and the reason why tliey are so is that, 
when any action is projjosed, ob.i'eetions of one sort or another generally occur 
to some member of the international body. Any action often involves a presumed 
advantage accorded to some rival nation, and its principle of internationalism, 
which is scornfully rejected in theory and hut too often recognized as a guide 
for practical action, that it is better to do nothing even though evil may ensue, 
than to allow good to be done at the expense of furthering the intei-ests, or of 
exalting the reputation of an international rival. For all purposes of action, 
tlierefore, administrative internationalism may be said to tend toward the crea- 
tion of administrative impotence. * * * 

The internationalism which I wish to condemn is, therefore, confined to wliat 
may be termed ])olitical internationalism ; that is to say, tlie system which admits 
f the employment of political agents, who, acting mider whatever instructions 
they may receive J'rom their several foreign officers, are pi-one to introduce into 
tlie discussion of some purely local question, considerations based on the friend- 
liness or hostility, in other parts of the world, of their countries of origin. 
Political passions are — or at any moment may become — too sti'ong to allow of 
an international system of this latter type working smoothly. 

If America, then, finds it her duty to accept a mandate in the Near 
East — a mandate offered to her by the powers — she should make it 
clear tliat she is doing so from a disinterested, humanitarian point of 
view and that her national traditions and polices are in no way 
affected thereby. 

If the American people could witness what we have witnessed, if 
the}'' could talk with the peoples who are phicing all their hopes on 
America and realize all that word now means to thousands who are 
only asking to have such conditions established as to permit them to 
live in peace, I do not believe they would hesitate for a moment to 
accejDt the task, gigantic though it is. 



32 MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 

No nation has ever been offered such an opportunity. No nation is 
so ideally equipped to accomplish it as America. 
Respectfully submitted. 

Geo. Van Horn Moseley, 
Brigadier General, National Army. 



Appendix B. 
the gendarmerie of turkey. 

I. Conditions before the war. — Previous to 1914 the Turkish gen- 
darmerie, which is directly within the jurisdiction of the minister 
of the interior and not the minister of war, operated with com- 
mendable success in most parts of Turkey, and an excellent degree 
of security was assured in the districts and on the roads over which 
traveling was most frequent. However, owing to inferior com- 
munication, certain sections of the country were virtually in a state 
of isolation; there brigandage reigned and neither law nor order 
was known. Coupled with this is the fact that the gendarme's pay 
was inadequate, and he sometimes fell to the temptation of increas- 
ing his income by cooperating with these brigands so that, at times, 
there was no security whatsoever within the remoter districts. Gen- 
erally, however, a gendarme's presence carried with it considerable 
security for those within his sphere of supervision, a circumstance 
now frequently referred to in Turk circles when comparing the 
lamentable conditions of the present service with that of prewar 
days. 

Up to the time when war was declared, the officers of the gen- 
darmerie were carefully selected from the army, and constituted 
really very good material. Each was graduated from a gendarmerie 
school in Constantinople at which he was, first of all, taught to read 
and write. He was enthusiastic in the prosecution of his duties — 
all of which were thoroughly known to him — and much of the suc- 
cess that crowned the operation of the gendarmerie as a public in- 
stitution was due to these officers' capacity. 

The noncommissioned officer of the gendarmerie , w^as also well 
instructed; he, too, attended classes specially organized for his edu- 
cation and training, and was there taught to read and write. 

The personnel of the gendarme force was composed of volun- 
teers and an element recruited ostensibly for military service; a 
large per cent of this force reenlisted not oftener that twice. Before 
assignment to any unit, these men were given courses of instruction 
at regimental schools so that they also were well fitted to perform 
the duties of their calling. 

This efficient system is the product of the enterprise of various 
foreign missions, and in particular to that headed by Gen. Bauman 
of the French Army, who was placed in charge of the Turkish 
Gendarmerie for a considerable lapse of time, terminating with the 
outbreak of the war in 1914. Under his capable direction a large 
personnel controlled the functioning of this department. 

II. Conditions during the armistice period. — The advent of the 
war practically destroyed all the good work previously accomplished, 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 33 

and with the cessation of hostilities came the realization that the 
gendarmerie had virtually lost all its value. Many sources of recruits 
ceased to exist; loss by death of many good officers and men 
occurred, for gendarmerie units were despatched to the front as 
part of the army at almost the very beginning of the war. All schools 
were closed and military commanders of districts appointed whom- 
soever they chose for the gendarme service. These appointments 
were made more by favor and bribery than for any ability on the 
part of those thus selected so that soon corrupt conditions replaced 
the once serviceable structure. 

The great size of Turkey and the poor service of communication 
throughout the interior made civil government therein impossible 
of enforcement and abuses such as deportations, pillaging, bribery, 
etc., became alarmingly abundant, in which disorders the poorly 
paid, underfed and disgruntled gendarme participated energetically 
with a view to bettering his meager share. 

III. Recent organization. — The recent organization of the Turkish 
Gendarmerie provided for what is termed a "commandement gen- 
eral" which, although established at Constantinople, is represented 
throughout the Turkish Empire by subunits called "inspection 
districts." 

The commandement general, at the head of which is the chief of 
the gendarmerie (called the commandant general), is actually the 
base on which the other elements of the gendarme structure rest. 
The functions of these headquarters are to set the principles and 
decide the practices of the service throughout the country. The 
commandement general is itself subdivided into three distinct groups, 
^ach of which is under the supervision of a colonel: Group I con- 
cerns itself in matters pertaining to operations; Group II concerns 
itself in matters dealing with the personnel; Group III concerns 
itself in matters relevant to administration. 

The subunits of the gendarmerie are the regiment, battalion, com- 
pany, section, and karakols (a group of from 6 to 12 men), each 
of which body functions within a specified administrative division 
of the country ; for example : A Vilayet is policed by one regiment 
in command of a lieutenant colonel; a sandjak is policed by one bat- 
talion in command of a major; a caza is policed by one company in 
command of a captain. 

A section is commanded by a first or second lieutenant, and a 
karakola — which is a small force used at a gendarme post — is com- 
manded by a noncommissioned officer. Certain battalions of the 
gendarmerie are identified as "independent battalions," for purposes 
of administration within independent political division of the coun- 
try. Several regiments or independent battalions under the command 
of a colonel (see Table No. 1) constitute an inspection district. 

Lack of fimds placed the gendarmerie in a very inferior position 
materially. The remuneration was entirely too inadequate to meet 
essential obligations (see Table No, 2 for past and present rates of 
pay), and little clothing was available; barracks were in a dilapi- 
dated condition and devoid of beds. Likewise, the equipment was 
very poor and for those supposed to be mounted, horses were not 
available. 

S. Doc. 281, 66-2 3 



34 MANDATORY OVER ARMEl^IA. 

In the matter of personnel much was left to be desired. Sur- 
viving officers of the prewar establishments were retaken into the 
service, but they, for diverse reasons, lost their former worth and 
became for the most part unscrupulous and dishonest characters. 
To this assortment must be added an inefficient element of army 
officers who were gathered promiscuously, and consequently knew 
nothing of their duties as gendarme agents. Even in the ranks 
of the service were found unsatisfactory men drawn from the army 
to complete their terms of service as military police. 

IV. (a) Mission for the reorganization of Turkish gendarmerie. — 
With the full approval of the allied Governments, a mission was 
organized, comprising Gen. Foulon of the French Army, 12 other 
French officers, and 2 Italians as his assistants, to reconstruct the 
Turkish gendarmerie. The British were invited to help in this 
task, but for one reason or another did not accept. Gen. Foulon, 
inspector general and chief of this mission, has spent considerable 
time in the Orient and has a thorough knowledge of the Turkish 
language. He is considered very well qualified to handle this diffi- 
cult role with credit. 

Confronted by the aforementioned corrupt conditions, the Fou- 
lon mission has decided to adopt the following measures : 

1. To incorporate a new order of regulations modeled along the 
French system. 

2. To provide the highest possible grade of personnel by judi- 
cious selection and recruitings. 

3. To reestablish training schools. 

4. To provide a foreign personnel capable of inculcating efficient 
administration and government. 

Already in the important cities of Constantinople, Brousa, 
Smyrna, Angora, Sivas, Samsun, and Trebizond reorganizing offi- 
cers of the Foulon mission are at wqrk eliminating, little by little, 
the bad element and replacing this with worthy and capable officers 
and men. By a strict surveillance much of the abuse heretofore 
suffered by the defenseless people has been eliminated and constant 
progress is regularly reported. 

Officers and men who have proven their capabilities will hence- 
forth have the positions to which they are assigned in the gendarme- 
rie guaranteed. Without written authority from the office of the 
chief of the mission no active member of the service shall be re- 
moved, transferred, or otherwise disposed of. Each of the person- 
nel has filed under his name a dossier, in which the usual entries 
are made, and from time to time this record is examined by a board 
of Turkish officers to determine the fitness of that person. 

Many schools have been reopened, including that for officers at 
Constantinople, to which over 60 men have reported only recently. 

The pay, too, of the gendarme has been improved, thanks to the 
efforts of Gen. Foulon, who, in this respect, has experienced con- 
siderable difficulty by reason of the wretched financial situation now 
prevalent in Turkey. 

A depot for clothes, which has up to recently been practically 
empty, is now well supplied with various assortments of garments 
from which shipments have already been made to the interior, so 
that for the coming winter each gendarme will be supplied a new 
uniform, shoes, etc. 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 



35 



The gendarme is in no way associated with the local police; he 
is obliged to be in uniform when on duty and must never function 
in any secret service or plain clothes capacity. He operates more 
particularly along country roads and isolated districts; in any 
event, as little as possible about the vicinity of his home. The 
normal term of enlistment of the gendarme is three years ; however, 
under certain circumstances one may agree to serve for one year 
only. 

V. HistoHcal. — The five officers of each of the great powers 
(France, England, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Kussia), detailed 
for duty in the Turkish Empire, arrived at Saloniki the end of April, 
1904. At about the same time one German, several Belgian and 
Swedish officers were also dispatched, and in 1906 each of these 
countries increased the number of its representatives by from 5 to 11. 

With the revolution of 1909 the Eussian and Austro-Hungarian 
officers returned to their respective capitals and by the time the re- 
organization program had reached its limit of development, the 
number of foreign officers was reduced to a total of 25, among whom 
were French, Italians, British, and one German. Then, with the 
Tripolian War, the Italians withdrew and subsequently there re- 
mained only the French mission headed by Gen. Bauman, his 15 
French Army officers, and the British. The French general contem- 
plated increasing the members of his staff to 50 when the war, 1914r- 
1918, necessitated his and the British representatives' withdrawal. 

Prepared and submitted by 

GUSTAVE ViLLARET, Jr., 

Captain^ Infantry^ A. D. C. 



Table No. 1. — Strength of the Turkish gendarmerie. 



Inspection • 


Regiment. 


Independent 
battalion^ 


Authorized 
strength. 


Actual strength. 


district. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Gen- 
darmes. 


Constantinople — 
Do . . . 






63 
78 
52 
30 
10 
22 


2,000 

1,604 

1,239 

720 

173 

600 


63 
78 
59 
29 
9 
18 


1,238 






1,415 


Do 


Broussa 




1,151 


Do . . 






751 


Do 




Tchataldja 


233 


Do 




Bolou 


578 










Total 


255 


6,336 


256 


5,366 












131 
25 
15 
15 
14 
22 


2,627 
950 
550 
380 
360 
847 


82 
36 
17 
13 
13 
18 


1 1,500 


Do 


Garassi 




845 


Do 




Dardanelles 


539 


Do 




Kutaliia 


375 


Do 




Kara-Hissar 


397 


Do 




Menteche 


412 










Total 


222 


5,714 


179 


4,068 












05 
00 
16 


1,100 
900 
325 


51 
44 
13 


1,079 


Do 






880 


Do 




Eski-CheMr 


312 










Total 


141 


2,325 


108 


2,271 











^Approximate. 



36 MANDATOEY OVER ARMENIA. 

Table No. 1. — Strength of the Turkish gendarmerie — Continued, 



Inspection 


Regiment. 


Independent 
battalion. 


Authorized 
strength. 


Actual Strength. 


district. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Gen- 
darmes. 


TToTiia . 


Konia 




53 
21 
17 
15 


852 
417 
301 
283 


44 
14 
14 
13 


1 352 


Do 




Anatolia 


'411 


Do 






337 


Do 




Nighde 


283 










Total 


106 


1,853 


85 


2 383 




Adana 






Adana 


34 
13 
17 
12 
16 


2,624 
332 
476 
880 

1,020 


75 
9 
9 
10 
15 


2 453 


Do 




Itch-Il . . 


'305 


Do 






495 


Do 




Aintab. . 


499 


Do 




Ourfa 


541 










Total 


' 92 


5,322 


118 


4 293 




Trebizond 






Trebizond 


87 
69 
17 


1,383 

1,096 

780 


59 
49 
15 


1,348 


Do 


Erzerum 




1,072 


Do. 




Erzinjan . . 


503 










Total 


173 


3,259 


123 


2 923 




Sivas 






Sivas 


100 
76 
20 


1,932 

1,273 

500 


57 
49 
22 


1,591 


Do 


Mamouret-ul-Aziz. . . 




1,404 


Do 




Djanilr 


717 










Total 


196 


3,705 


128 


3,712 




Bitlis 






Bitlis 


60 
68 
58 


1,552 
1,571 
1,605 


34 
52 
31 


831 


Do 


Diartaekir 




1,573 


Do 


Van 




386 










Total 


186 


4,728 


117 


2,790 










Grand total. 


1,371 


33,242 


1,114 


27,806 









October 13, 1919. 



Table No. 2.- — Monthly 



Grades, 



End of 
1918. 



Present 
pay. 



Commander general 

Adjutant of commander general 

Regiment commander 

Battalion commander 

Senior captain 

Captain 

Fii-st Jieutenant 

Second lieutenant 

Cadet 

Idare mudmi (director administrative) . 

Idare emini (director general) 

Idare muavin (aid) 

Tabom Idatibi (regiment secretary) 

Imam (priest) 

Tabour muavi (assistant) 

Armurier (sword cutler) 

Beuluk kiatibi (secretary of battalion: 

Married 

Bachelor 

Sergeant major: 

Married 

Bachelor 

Sergeant: 

Married 

Bachelor 

Corporal: 

Married 

Bachelor 

Mounted sergeant major (bachelor) 

Sergeant, mounted (bachelor) 

Mounted corporal (bachelor) 

Movmted gendarme (bachelor) 



Piasters. 
10,110 



4,485 
2,860 
1,922 
1,610 
1,297 
1,172 

688 
2,860 
2,110 
1,735 
1,485 
1,235 

860 
1,110 

547 



300 



275 
262 



Piasters, 
14, 160 
8,460 
6,800 
4,774 
4,123 
3,612 
3,100 
2,760 
1,796 
4,774 
4,293 
3,612 
3,100 
2,519 
2,278 
2,278 

1,650 
1,150 

1,650 
1,150 

1,600 
1,100 

1,550 
1,000 



337 
312 
300 

287 



MANDATOKY OVER AEMENIA. 
Table No. 3. 



37 



Inspection district. 


Regiment. 


Independent battalion. 


Battal- 
ions. 


Com- 
panies. 


Inde- 
pendent 
sections. 








3 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 


11 
13 

9 
5 
1 
5 


4 


Do 






12 


Do ... . 






3 


Do 






3 


Do 




Tchataldja 


2 


Do 




Boulou 


4 










Total 


12 


44 


28 












5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 


24 
6 
2 
3 
3 
6 


16 


Do 


Carassi 




5 


Do ... 




Dardanelles 


4 


Do 




Kutahia 


1 


Do 




Af. Kara Hissar 

Menteche 


3 


Do 














Total 


10 


44 


29 




Angora 








4 
3 

1 


10 
11 
3 


6 




Castamouni 




3 


Do ... . 




EsMehehir 


2 










Total 


8 


24 


11 




Konia 






Konia 


2 
1 

1 
1 


9 
3 
3 
2 


10 






Anatalia 


5 


Do. . 




Cesaria 


1 


Do 




Nigbde 


5 










Total. 


5 


17 


21 




Adana 






Adana 


2 
1 
1 
1 
1 


7 
2 
4 
3 
3 




Do 




Idjil 


1 


Do 




Marache 




Do 




Aintab 




Do. . . 




Ourfa 














6 


19 


1 




Trebizond 








4 
2 
1 


16 
13 

4 


3 


Do 


Erzerum 




3 


Do.. . . 




Erzinjan 














' 


33 


6 




Sivas 








4 
3 
1 


20 
16 

4 




Do 


Mamouret el Aziz ..... 






Do 




Djanik 


2 










Total 


8 


40 


2 




Bitlis 






BitUs 


4 
4 
3 


12 
10 

8 


1 


Do 


Diarbekir 




4 


Do 


Van 




1 












11 


30 


6 












67 


251 


104 











38 



maistdatory over armenia. 
Appendix C. 



Statistics showing the fighting strength, numher of mouths, horses, mules, and 
other anim,als and, also of arms and ^car supplies in the Armenian Army on 
Sept. 26, 1919. 





Men. 


Animals. 


With 
pistols. 


Guns. 


Names of units. 


Bayo- 
nets. 


Mouths. 


Horses. 


Mules. 


Oxen. 


Camels. 


Field. 


Moun- 
tain. 




2,931 

1,800 

783 

389 


4,573 

2,370 

1,396 

482 

362 

15 

49 

140 
944 
2,306 
75 
2,789 
1,395 
1,365 
3,198 


228 

102 

147 

5 

3 


67 
33' 


422 
17 

8 

8 

24 


3 


4 


4 


g 


Karakliss detachment 


2 


Alexandropol detachment . . . 


■ 






2 


Kars sentry battalion , 










Ears fortress artillery 




32 






Office of military chief 








Aviation detachment 




3 

13 
17 

142 
2 

381 
95 














Independent infantry board 
brigade headquarters 
(fourth) 
















Seventh infantry regiment . . . 


795 
1,583 
50 
1,871 
1,105 
1,204 
1,059 








2 
3 




4 


Ka.marlu detachment 

EchTniadriTi detaohment, 


73 


100 




4 


Tgdir detachment 


114 
1 








4 


4 


Noxobaiaset detachment 








2 


Daralagor detachment 










Erivan garrison 


161 


133 




4 


6 


10 








Total 


13,570 


21,459 


1,299 


421 


679 


3 


45 


14 


30 









Machine guns. 


Rifles. 


Swords. 




Names of units. 


Colt. 


Maxim. 


Lewis. 


3-inch 
Rus- 
sian. 


Lebel. 


Ber- 
dan. 


Cara- 
bine. 


Other 
makes. 


Poin- 
ards. 




13 


11 

8 

5 


39 

7 

5 
1 


4,266 
2,105 

736 
364 


'"'2i6" 
2 


5 
120 

443 
373 
100 
20 










Blarakliss detachment 


10 


50 

15 
2 






Alexandropol detach- 
ment 




6 


20 








Kars fortress artillery . . . 










Aviation detachment . . . 




















Independent infantry 
board brigade head- 
quarters (fourth) 








47 

629 

634 

84 

1,109 
685 
900 

1,579 


16 

21 

817 




2 

22 

.. 






Seventh infantry regi- 
ment 


10 
5 






6 
36 




2 

28 




Kamarlu detachment . . . 


17 


2 




Echmiadrin detachment 








Tgdir detachment 


5 
2 
3 

8 


4 


12 
5 
6 


805 

83 

200 

9 






400 
93 






83 








Daralagor detachment... 
Erivan garrison 






32 


5 


9 


23 


8 










Total 


46 


51 


77 


13,138 


2,163 


1,218 


15 


593 


59 


28 







MANDATORY OVEE AEMENIA. 
Statistics showing the fighting strength, etc. — Continued. 



39 





Shells. 


Cartridges. 


Names of units. 


Shrap- 
nel. 


Gre- 
nade. 


Moun- 
tain. 


Light. 


Rus- 
sian. 


Lebel. 


Lewis. 


Berdan. 


Turk- 
ish. 


Other 
makes. 


Kars detachment 


954 




1,390 
280 

280 


948 


183,637 
50,000 

36,337 
38,000 

1,555 

77,500 
136,160 
25,000 
143; 000 
28,400 
80,000 
34, 730 




225,080 






36, 731 


Karakliss detachment . 









AlexandJopol detach- 
ment 






12,540 
11,000 

800 

1,300 
184,491 


27, 720 
7,000 


3,850 
50,800 






Kars sentry battalion 










Independent infantry 
board brigade head- 
quarters (fourth) 












157 


Seventh infantry regi- 
ment 


160 


160 
400 






3,933 
86,800 


1,000 

587 




6,370 


Kamarlu detachment 








Echmiadrin detachment 












Tgdir detachment 




420 


592 
805 




260,000 
56,315 


1 


37,500 
63,860 




Noxobaiaset detachment 




1 850 














96 


100 








1 




















Total 


1,210 


1,080 


3,347 


948 


834,319 


526,446 


350,533 


57,087 


101,360 


43,258 







Appendix D. 



INFORMATION ON THE QUESTIONS ( 1 ) WHO SERVES IN THE TROOPS OF THE 
ARMENIAN REPUBLIC ? ( 2 ) WHETHER RECRUITING EXISTS ; AND IF SO, 
UPON WHAT BASIS? 

1. Though from the very beginning of the Great War there already 
existed some Armenian units, the real development and formation of 
these units began with the evacuation of the Caucasian front by the 
Russian Army in 1918. To replace the troops which were going away 
the nations of Transcaucasia began in earnest to form their national 
units, Armenian units included. The material for the formation of 
these units consisted principally of disbanded units, together with 
some volunteers and some classes of raw recruits called in accordance 
with the national council's decision. The national principle adopted 
in the beginning of formation remained the same until the present 
time, with the exception that in the effective force of the Army and 
also in the administration and institutions of the military department 
there is a certain per cent of officers, physicians, and ranks from the 
]Russians, who desired to continue voluntarily in the service in 
Armenia. 

In view of the indefiniteness of the boundaries of Armenia and of 
the absence of the law concerning the question of military recruiting 
of citizens of other nationalities remained open, and in the meantime 
it was taken for a basis that this recruitment must be executed by all 
the Armenians living on the territory of the Armenian Republic. 

2. Military recruiting exists in Armenia, and as regards this re- 
cruiting Armenia follows the Russian martial law and other legisla- 
tion used in this respect in Russia. 

Nevertheless, the contemporary political activity and the extreme 
effort of the country in defending with arms in hands its existence 
does not permit to pass to the peaceable situation and keeps the 
country on a war footing. Thus, in spite of the Government law 
of July 1, by which the term of military service was fixed at 18 years 



40 MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 

(3 years' active service and 15 years' reserve) , the present threatening 
attitude makes it necessar}^ not only to keep in active military service 
five ages of conscripts (from 20 to 25 years) but also to call five 
additional ages of the reserve ; that is, up to 30 years, and officers up 
to 40 years of age. 

The enormous demand for complements for the existing and the 
newly formed units on the one side, and the scarcity of reserve 
soldiers for the requirements of the army on the other side, makes 
necessary a reduction to the minimum of the number of exemptions 
from service, especially — 

(a) In each family the provider is exempt in the absence of other 
members capable of labor. 

(h) Scholars of the superior schools upon reaching the age of 20 
are immediately subject to military service, and pupils of the middle 
schools after having finished their studies. 

(c) The officers of all categories, being in reserve, are called into 
service in necessary numbers, according to the judgment of the war 
minister and by his direction. 

(d) No members of any other departments are exempt from serv- 
ice, with the exception of those persons who at the time are serving 
in postal telegraph institutions (except watchmen and errant-por- 
ters), militia, customhouses, commissaries of districts, and sections 
with their helpers, judges, procurators, and coroners. 

The law of the Armenian Parliament of September 9 provides that 
persons called into military service from their employments in the 
Government service and with private concerns shall retain their posi- 
tions and wages, and the families of the reservists and warriors ac- 
cepted for military service shall receive pecuniary relief. 

Makkaveef, Coloiiel. 

Appendix E. 

organization of the armed forces of the republic of georgia. 

As is generally known, the inhabitants of the Republic of Georgia 
are descendants of the oldest civilized race of mankind. In ancient 
history they are known under the name of Chaldeans, who inhabited 
the area of Babylon. During its entire history, covering a period 
of 3,000 years, the Georgians have been continually engaged in 
warfare with the uncivilized and savage races surrounding her on 
every side. After Christ, the Georgians always struggled against 
the enemies of the Gospel. For this reason the various nations 
of Asia Minor consider Georgia as a warrior, continually fighting 
for the highest ideals of mankind. A study of the sayings and 
songs of the surrounding nations fully convince us of that. 

In accordance with the treaty between Eussia and Georgia, the 
latter remained a sovereign State and had a separate army, but 
nullifiction by degrees of the independence of Georgia and the rami- 
fication of the population followed the disbanding of the Georgian 
Army. The old Russian Government, however, realizing the value 
of the Georgian as a warrior, retained special Georgian regiments 
as part of the Russian Army until the end of the nineteenth century. 



MANDATORY OVER ARMEl^IA. 4l 

This was due to the fact that during the Russian \vars in the Cau- 
casus in the nineteenth century the Georgians distinguished them- 
selves as very good sokliers. Thus the Georgians were very much 
offended when, toward the end of the nineteenth century, the exist- 
ence of the Georgian regiments came to an end. Since that time 
the young men of Georgia have been sent for military service to 
Siberia, Archangel, and Poland. Unaccustomed to the severe cli- 
mate in these countries, a good many of them died, and those who did 
return to their homes were for the most part ill with consumption. 

During the late war with Germany the Republic of Georgia con- 
tributed to the Russian Army over 160,000 men and 5,000 officers. 
It is worth}^ of mention that the percentage of Georgians decorated 
for bravery and those killed and wounded during the Great War is 
much higher than that of any other nation in the Russian Empire, 
not excluding the Russians themselves. 

As soon as it became evident in the latter part of 1917 that the 
Russian Army would be disorganized and that the Georgians would 
be left to their own destiny in the uneven struggle with Turkey, 
the Georgians proceeded to organize a national army corps. Condi- 
tions were very bad ; bolshevism was gaining on all sides ; the coun- 
try was threatened with anarchy ; Russian bolshevists running away 
from the front threatened to invade the whole country ; and Georgian 
soldiers themselves, returning rmo Russian bolshevist regiments, 
could not be used as defenders of their own country. In spite of 
these difficulties a force of about 30,000 men was organized to fight 
against Turkey, but unfortunately they had no war materials. There 
were only 10,000 rifles available, for prior to this everything had 
been sent from the Tiflis depot to the front, and therefore had 
fallen into the hands of the Turks or had been taken by the Rus- 
sian bolshevist soldiers. In spite of these bad conditions the Geor- 
gian troops, together with the so-called national guard, endeav- 
ored to defend Batum. They fought successfully at the river 
Cholox, under Osourguety, in Axhaltsykt and Borchels Provinces. 
The inability of the Georgians to secure help from the Allies com- 
pelled Georgia to seek other means for saving the physical existence 
of her people. 

In 1918, with the Great War still in progress and fighting might 
still be expected in the Trans-Caucasus, the Georgians organized an 
army consisting of two infantry divisions, with an artillery, a fron- 
tier brigade, a cavalry brigade, an army artillery brigade and engi- 
neers ; almost all of them numbered as in war time, the army total- 
ing 2,000 officers and 39,000 men. During this year, with the Great 
War ended and the hope strong that the League of Nations and the 
Paris peace conference will not permit any more blood to be shed, 
the Georgian Constituent Assembly passed a new law concerning the 
organization of armed forces in the State. According to this law 
the armed forces of the Republic consist of an army and national 
guard. On a peace-time basis the army consists of about 900 officers 
and 14,000 men. It is composed of 3 infantry brigades with artillery, 
frontier troops, Tiflis guard battalion, cavalry regiment, army artil- 
lery division, battalion of sappers, motor-car company, company of 
aviators, wireless company. 



42 MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 

An infantry brigade consists of four infantry battalions and one 
artillery division. One battalion consists of five companies, one ma- 
chine-gun company, and several platoons of telephonists, scouts, etc. 
An artillery division consists of 3 batteries. A cavalry regiment has 
three squadrons and one machine-gun Squadron. Frontier troops 
have six frontier detachments. A battalion of sappers has two com- 
panies of sappers and two companies of telegraphists. A motor-car 
company has three motor-cars and one armored motor-car platoon. 
An aviation school for the company of aviators. A wireless company 
has two constant and two field wireless stations. The men serve in 
the infantry 16 months, and in special troops 20 months. 

The highest command in peace time belong to the war minister, 
who has an assistant general. In time of war all the troops are under 
the command of a commander in chief, who is appointed by a special 
decree of the Government. 

The chief of the general staff is the chief of staff of the army in 
peace time as well as in war. 

There is a military school to prepare oiRcers for the army, and 
attached to this school is a corporal's battalion for training corporals 
for the whole army. 

In the war office there is a special section looking after the mental 
training of soldiers in the army. Every soldier is taught to read and 
write. 

In war time according to our plans we may put into the field an 
army of about 200,000 men. In the Great War Georgia has given to 
the Russian army 160,000 soldiers. 

The national guard being quite a national organization was formed 
in the latter part of 1917, and together with the army rendered great 
service to the country. The national guard is composed of reliable 
volunteers, who are not obliged to serve in the army, and it is as 
successfully used against the enemy as it is for the maintenance of 
order in the country. Usually it consists, of one infantry brigade, 
but if necessary it may be mobilized by the order of the prime 
minister of the republic. The things required for the army are 
numerous. It has already been stated above that on account of the 
lack of equipment in the early part of 1918 we could not continue 
our struggle against Turkey. At the present time the need of 
essential equipment is still greater. We are in need of rifles, guns, 
and ammunition, and we want them of the Russian pattern, as we 
have already Russian rifles, etc., and t)ur own soldiers are used to 
them. We want also technical things, equipment, clothing, boots, 
and bread for the army. 

All the details will be forwarded if the question of satisfying our 
requirements will be settled in a positive way. 

N. Ramishvili, 
Minister of War. 

Appendix G. 

amendments to the turkish armistice. 

There are three flag officers on the active list of whom two only 
are at present employed. The names of all three are shown in order 
of seniority ; also the chief of the naval staff. 



MANDATORY OVER ARMENIA. 



43 



Name of command. 


Flagship, 


Name and rank. 


(1) Seniority, (2) date 
of appointment. 


G.O.S. 






Rear Admiral Arif 

Pasha. 
Rear Admiral Vassif 

Pasha. 
Rear Admiral Ibrahim 

Pasha. 


/(I) 7/10/17 


}Nil. 
} Do. 




Imperial yacht Erto- 
gul. 


1(2) 16/ 8/14 




/(I) 7/10/17 




1(2) 19/ 2/19 


Commodore imperial 


((1) 6/10/18 


1 Do. 


yachts (2). 


\(2) 12/ 3/16 





TTJEKEY. 



The Turkish Navy is interned under allied supervision in accord- 
ance with article 6 of the armistice with Turkey dated October 30, 
1918. 

Imperial Ottoman Navy — Nominal list of all vessels. 

[Figures in parentheses after each name is displacement in tons. Unless otherwise stated 
all are at Constantinople.] 



Battleship, Toorgood Reis, ex Weissen- 

burg (9,901). 
Battle crui.ser, Yavouz Sultan Selim, ex 

Goeben (23,000), at Ismid. 
Light cruisers : 

Hamidieh (3,805). 

Medjidieh (3,250). 
Torpedo gunboats : 

Berg-I-Satvet (775). 

Perik-I-Shevket ( 775 ) , 
Torpedo-boat destroyers : 

Muavanet-I-Millet (616). 

Noumoune-I-Hamiyet (616). 

Bassra (300). 

Samsouu (300). 

Tashoz (300). 
Torpedo boats : 

Berk-Efshan (270). 

Sivri Hissar (98). 

Sultan Hissar (98). 

Ack Hissar (145). 

Drach (160). 

Moussoul (160). 

Younnous (160). 
Motor launches (600 feet Thorney- 
croft) : 

At Constantinople, Nos. 11, 13, 15, 
17, 18, 19, 20, 21. 

At Smyrna, No. 14. 

Lost during the war, Nos. 1, 2, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 12, 16. 

Lost during Italian war, Nos. 9, 10. 

Not received from contractors, 
Nos. 3, 4, 22. 
Submarines, none. 
Sloops and gunboats : 

Aiden Reis (510), Trebizond, po- 
lice duties. 



Sloops and gunboats — Continued. 

Burrack Reis (510). 

Prevesah (510), Sinope, police du- 
ties. 

Sakiz (510). 

Kemal, ex Durack Reis (420). 

Hizir Reis (520), Smyrna, police 
duties. 

Issa Reis (420). 

Malatia (210), seriously damaged 
by mine. 

Zuhaf (650), surveying ship, at 
Ismid. 

Barik-I-Zaifer (198). 
Mining vessels : 

Intibah (616), 60 mines on deck. 

Nusrat (360), 25 mines, in ^gean 
Sea with mine-clearance force. 
Transports : 

Rechid Pasha (4,426). 

Kiresund (3,056 gross), mine de- 
pot. 

Ourla (4,171 gross), no rudder or 
propeller. 

Tir-I-Mujghian (3,936), training 
ship. 
Yachts : 

Stamboul (910), paddle. 

Izzedin (1,075), paddle. 

Galata (140), screw. 

Ertougal (900), screw. 

Sugutli (110), screw. 
Armored vessels : 

Idjlalieh (2,266), training ship. 

Muin-I-Zaffer (2,400), training 
ship. 

Ned j mi Shevket (2,080), depot 
ship. 



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